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NONSTATUTORY REVIEW OF FEDERAL
ADMJNISTRATIVE ACTION: THE NEED
FOR STATUTORY REFORM OF
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY,
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION,
AND PARTIES DEFENDANT
Roger C. Cramton*
I wish the State of society was so far improved, and the science
of Government advanced to such a degree of perfection, as that the
whole nation could in the peaceable course of law, be compelled to
do justice, and be sued by individual citizens.
-Chief Justice John J ay1
is unfortunate but true that the wishes of our first Chief Justice
remain unfulfilled some 175 years later. The ability of citizens
to obtain effective relief against the United States and its agencies
"in the peaceable course of law" is incomplete and inadequate.
Some progress has been made. The establishment by Congress in
the Tucker Act2 and the Federal Tort Claims Act3 of twfa systems
of federal monetary liability, one for contract and one for tort, represented an enormous step forward. But the essential goal-"that
the whole nation could in the peaceable course of law, be compelled
to do justice, and be sued by individual citizens"-has not yet been
achieved.
Gnotta v. United States4 provides a recent illustration of the remaining deficiencies. Gnotta, an engineer of Italian descent em-

I

T

• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1950, Harvard University; J.D.
1955, University of Chicago.-Ed.
This Article is based in part upon reports that I have prepared as consultant to
the Committee on Judicial Review of the Administrative Conference of the United
States. The Conference has not evaluated or approved this Article; the responsibility
for its contents is solely mine. I am indebted, however, to members of the Committee
on Judicial Review for insights and comments that have shaped my thinking on the
problems dealt with here. I am also indebted to Professor Clark Byse of the Harvard
Law School and Professor Kenneth Culp Davis of the University of Chicago Law
School, whose past contributions and generous counsel have laid the groundwork for
whatever is of value in this Article.
1. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 478 (1793) (emphasis added).
2. 24 Stat. 505 (1887), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a), (b), (d) (1964) (district courts);
28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1964) (Court of Claims). The Tucker Act was preceded by the Court
of Claims Act, IO Stat. 612 (1855).
3. 60 Stat. 812, 842 (1946), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 1402(b), 1504, 2110,
2401-02, 2411-12, 2671-80 (1964).
4. 415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969).
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ployed in a field office of the Army Corps of Engineers, remained in
his initial grade of appointment after a dozen years of service. He
charged that his superiors had refused to provide him opportunities
for advancement because of his ethnic origin. An executive order
proscribes such discrimination unequivocally and provides "for the
prompt, fair, and impartial consideration of all complaints of discrimination in Federal employment" by the employing agency and
the Civil Service Commission. 5 The Commission held a lengthy
hearing at which testimony supporting and contradicting Gnotta's
claim of discrimination was received. After an adverse determination by the Commission, Gnotta sought judicial review in a suit in
a United States district court, naming as defendants the United
States, the Civil Service Commission, and the employees of the Army
Corps of Engineers who supervised his work. The district court
dismissed the suit on the ground "that Gnotta's selected procedure
and his choice of defendants raise serious questions of governmental
immunity and of consequent jurisdiction" 6 and the dismissal was
affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit.
Why is it that "Gnotta's appeal necessarily falls because of the
identity of the defendants he had chosen to sue"?7 The court listed
these reasons:
(I) "One cannot sue the United States without its consent ..."; 8
(2) "'Congress has not constituted the [United States Civil Service] Commission a body corporate or authorized it to be sued eo
no mine ... ' "; 9 and
(3) the doctrine of sovereign immunity stood in the way of suit
against the individual defendants:
A suit against an officer of the United States is one against the
United States itself "if the decree would operate against" the sovereign; ... or if "the judgment sought would expend itself on the
public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration" ... ; or if the effect of the judgment would be "to restrain the
Government from acting, or to compel it to act" .... These principles, we feel, operate to identify the first and second counts against
the named individuals with counts against the United States, for
relief under the counts would compel those individuals to promote
5. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 comp.).
6. 415 F.2d at 1276. The district court decision is unreported.
7. 415 F.2d at 1276.
8. 415 F.2d at 1276, citing United States v. Shenvood, 312 U.S. 584, 586-88 (1941).
9. 415 F.2d at 1277, citing Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512, 514-16 (1952); Bell v.
(:;roak, 371 F.2d 202, 204 (7th Cir. 1966),
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the plaintiff, with the natural effect a promotion has upon the
Treasury, and to exercise administrative discretion in an official
personnel area.10
One's sense of justice would not be pricked if the court, reaching
the merits, had decided that the administrative determination was
supported by substantial evidence. Somewhat less satisfying, but
tolerable, would have been a decision in which the court, after
·wrestling with federal civil service law and regulations, held that
adverse determinations of the Civil Service Commission were subject to only limited review11 or that the particular matter of personnel advancement was "committed to agency discretion by law"
and hence nonreviewable.12 But it is disheartening that the "State
of society" is so little improved from Jay's era that dogmas of sovereign immunity and technical rules about parties defendant should
foreclose judicial review of federal administrative action.
The purpose of this Article is to generate support for three legislative proposals that will rectify the problems exemplified by the
Gnotta case and hosts of other cases: (1) The elimination of the doctrine of sovereign immunity as a barrier to judicial review of federal
administrative action; (2) a modest expansion of the subject matter
jurisdiction of United States district courts to accommodate such
review and, in addition, to provide a remedy against the United
States for the resolution of property disputes; and (3) the total elimination of the remaining technicalities concerning the identification,
naming, capacity, and joinder of parties defendant in actions challenging federal administrative action. 13
10. 415 F.2d at 1277, citing and quoting from, respectively, Hawaii v. Gordon, 373
U.S. 57, 58 (1963); Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947); Larson v. Domestic &:
Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620
(1963).
11. Compare Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), affd. by an equally
divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (judicial review of the discharge of a federal
employee is limited to determining whether the employee received the protection of
prescribed administrative procedures), with Charlton v. United States, 412 F.2d 390 (3d
Cir. 1969) (scope of judicial review is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act).
See also Craycroft, The Scope of Judicial Review Afforded a Civil Service Employee's
Discharge, 3 HARV. LEGAL COl\11\IENTARY 12 (1966).
12. See, e.g., Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290 (1900); McEachern v. United States,
321 F.2d 31, 33 (4th Cir. 1963). The court in Gnotta, stating that "promotion ••. of
employees ••• is a matter of supervisory discretion and not subject to judicial review,"
considered resting its decision on this ground, but concluded that a charge of ethnic
discrimination could not be bypassed in this way. 415 F.2d at 1275-76.
13. For the proposed revisions of 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 703 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968); 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1964); and 28 U.S.C. § 139I(e) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), see pp. 468-70
infra. These proposals are restricted to actions brought in federal courts. The reasons
for not exposing the United States and its agencies to suit in state courts, except under
special consent statutes, rest upon the notion that the federal courts are specially qual-
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Before turning to a consideration of the problems to be solved,
the pattern of existing remedies against the United States and its
officers must be briefly sketched.
The law of remedies against the United States is a complicated
mosaic of judge-made rules and statutory enactments. The initial
premise, once the doctrine of sovereign immunity was held to have
survived the American Revolution, was that the United States could
not be sued by name without its consent. 14 Since this immunity came
to be viewed as a defect affecting the subject matter jurisdiction of
federal courts, 15 federal officers or lawyers could not confer jurisdiction by purporting to waive the sovereign's immunity; only the
Congress could consent on behalf of the United States.16
In a society in which the rule of law has any meaning, it would
be intolerable if private persons harmed by official conduct were
without any remedy whatsoever. Therefore, our legal system has
always provided some exceptions to the rigid rule of sovereign immunity, although the form of those exceptions has shifted over the
years. In the nineteenth century, prior to the enactment of a profusion of statutory remedies, the action against the ·wrongdoing
officer was the mainstay of the system. The officer who, in causing
injury to a private person, exceeded his authority or violated constitutional limitations was liable for damages or, in a proper case,
injunctive relief.17
Gradually, however, sentiment built up for the direct provision
of damages in an action against the federal government. The inadequacies of the common-law damage action against an officer and the
ified to decide the questions of federal law that arise in such actions. The desire of
government lawyers to litigate in federal courts, when coupled with the broad removal
provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1442 (1964), also provides a practical argument in the
same direction.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941); Minnesota v. United
States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939).
15. The theory of the sovereign's immunity from suit without consent requires
that the jurisdictional objection be considered a matter affecting the competence of
the court, unlike objections with respect to personal jurisdiction, which may be
waived by an attorney's general appearance or submission. See Case v. Terrell, 78 U.S.
(11 Wall.) 199 (1871), in which the Court found it "incredible" that a federal court,
in the absence of a consent statute, could render a judgment against the United States,
even though the Comptroller of the Currency had appeared and had defended the
action on behalf of the United States. See also note 45 infra.
16. See, e.g., Case v. Terrell, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 199 (1871).
17. The classic exposition of the availability of injunctive relief against the officer
is in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), a case involving a state officer. The federal
cases make no distinction between the application of sovereign immunity in actions
against federal officers and its application in actions in federal courts against state
officers.
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desire to encourage persons to contract with the United States on
favorable terms led Congress to provide a new contract remedy. In
1855 Congress made its first general provision for the recovery of
damages against the Government itself; it created the Court of Claims
and empowered that court to award damages against the United
States in actions arising out of government contracts.18 That statute,
the Court of Claims Act, was followed in 1887 by the Tucker Act, 19
which expanded the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and conferred concurrent jurisdiction in certain cases on the district courts.
Not until 1946 was the corresponding step taken with respect to
tort liability, an advance that was long overdue when it was made
because the tort action against the officer had been unsatisfactory to
both the Government and the claimant. Exposing a government
official to personal liability in potentially large amounts for the good
faith, though mistaken, performance of his duties, might constrain
his actions and delay his decisions, both of which would work to
the detriment of effective government.20 On the other hand, judicial
efforts to ameliorate the officer's plight by immunizing him from
tort liability had had the effect of depriving the injured citizen of
monetary relief.21 The solution of the dilemma, taken in 1946 with
the Federal Tort Claims Act,22 was governmental tort liability. Governmental responsibility both in contract and in tort is now well
established and in broad outline totally successful.23
18. IO Stat. 612.
19. 24 Stat. 505.
20. See the famous statement of Judge Learned Hand in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177
F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949):
[T]o submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a
trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all
but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of
their duties. Again and again the public interest calls for action which may turn
out to be founded on a mistake, m the face of which an official may later find
himself hard put to it to satisfy a jury of his good faith.
21. The federal officers' immunity from tort has rapidly expanded from a protection available to those exercising judicial functions [Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 335 (1871)] to a virtually absolute immunity of all high-level officials for acts
done under color of office. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Howard v. Lyons, 360
U.S. 593 (1959). See generally L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF .AD!IIINISTRATIVE ACTION
ch. 7 (1965); Handler &: Klein, The Defense of Privilege in Defamation Suits Against
Government Executive Officials, 74 HARV. L. R.Ev. 44 (1960).
22. 60 Stat. 812, 842, as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 1402(b), 1504, 2110, 2401-02,
2411-12, 2671-80 (1964), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 240l(b), 2671-75, 2679(b) (Supp. IV,
1965-1968). In 1966 Congress enacted legislation designed to facilitate settlement and
payment by government lawyers of tort claims against the United States. 80 Stat. 306.
For a useful discussion of the Act, see Jacoby, The 89th Congress and Government
Litigation, 67 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 1212 (1967).
23. General satisfaction with governmental liability for money damages should not
stand in the way of needed improvements. One such improvement is the reconsideration and possible narrowing of the exceptions in the Federal Tort Claims Act,

394

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 68:387

In addition to the damage remedies, however, there were nonstatutory and nonmonetary remedies against official action, and it is
the latter-day development of these remedies with which this Article
is concerned. The common law had been a rich storehouse of such
remedies, but the extraordinary remedies available in England and
in most of the states before the Revolution survived America's transformation into a federal republic only in reduced numbers. Aside
from habeas corpus, the federal courts were limited to injunction
and mandamus, and the availability of the latter was limited to
federal courts in the District of Columbia. 24 Thus the injunction
suit, later supplemented by the declaratory judgment, 25 became the
all-purpose method of challenging federal administrative action prior
to the development in the modern era of the independent regulatory
agency with its mm special statutory review provisions.26 The spread
of such provisions in recent decades and their extension to some
executive functions has channelled most judicial review of federal
administrative action into the form of "statutory" review under such
special statutes. But many governmental functions, especially those
delegated to the older executive departments, are still reviewable
only in "nonstatutory review" actions.27 "Nonstatutory review" of
federal administrative action refers to judicial review that is not obtained under a specific statutory review provision; it includes review
especially the immunity of the United States for most intentional torts committed by
officers. See Gellhom & Lauer, Federal Liability for Personal and Property Damage, 29
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1325, 1341 (1954). A second improvement is correction of the omission
from the Tucker Act of money damages in quasi-contract or restitution. See note 213

infra.
24. See the excellent discussion in Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstat•
utory" Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75
HARv. L. REv. 1479, 1499-502 (1962).
25. See Federal Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964). Declaratory
and injunctive relief are used interchangeably and in combination with one another.
Both are subject to the same limitations with respect to availability. See Developments
in the Law-Declaratory Judgments-1941-1949, 62 HARV. L. REv. 787 (1949).
26. For general discussions of the federal remedial pattern, and the special reliance
on injunction, see 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISI"RATIVE LAW TREATISE ch. 23 (1958, Supp. 1965);
L. JAFFE, supra note 21, ch. 5.
27. Although generalization is hazardous, functions performed by the older executive departments are generally reviewable only in nonstatutory review actions.
Among these are the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Justice, Interior, Agri•
culture, Commerce, and Labor. For famous examples of nonstatutory review, sec
American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902) (postal fraud
order); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922) (alien deportation); United States
ex rel. Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U.S. 316 (1903) (Department of Interior
land grant). For a summary of judicial review provisions as of 1962, see COMM. ON
JUDICIAL REVIEW, ADMINISI"RATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, STATUTORY PR.oVISIONS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL ADMINISI"RATIVE ACTION (Sept. 1962).
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proceedings that seek specific relief against a federal officer by injunction, mandamus, habeas corpus, or other common-law remedies. 28
Nonstatutory review of federal administrative action rests on \
the premise, sometimes referred to as the presumption ?f a right to
judicial review, 29 that courts can make a useful contribution to administration by testing the legality of official action which adversely
affects private persons. The presumption of reviewability is reflected
not only in court decisions but in a plethora of statutes in which
Congress has provided a special procedure for reviewing particular
administrative activity.30 If there is no such special consent to suit,
the plaintiff must seek judicial review by invoking the general jurisdiction of a United States district court in a nonstatutory-review
action. The theory and operation of nonstatutory review are that the
officer who has committed a ·wrong to a private individual is answerable for his conduct unless he can establish that federal law justified
his action.31 Injunctive relief is available on the ground that an officer
has or will commit tortious acts and that the subsequent damage
remedy is generally inadequate.
This brief introduction suggests but does not fully reflect the
troubled relationship of the doctrine of sovereign immunity to nonstatutory review. Indeed, a series of Supreme Court decisions in the
past twenty-five years has complicated the relationship even further.32
Meanwhile, remedial attempts to solve technical problems of the
law of parties defendant have made some headway, but, as the Gnotta
case illustrates, room for improvement remains.
28. The term "nonstatutory review" will be used in this Article as a shorthand \
reference to judicial review proceedings that take the form of injunction, declaratory
judgment, mandamus, or other specific relief. It is recognized that in a sense the term
is misleading, since federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and there must be
in every case a constitutional or statutory basis of jurisdiction. The distinctive aspect
of "nonstatutory review," however, is the reliance on common-law remedies, with
subject matter jurisdiction predicated on the general federal-question provision of 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1964) or on a special federal-question provision such as that of 28
U.S.C. § 1337 (1964) for claims "arising under" any act of Congress "regulating commerce.'' Although the latter is a "special" jurisdictional provision, it is not one limited
to judicial review of administrative action.
29. See L. JAFFE, supra note 21, at 336-52.
30. See the review provision of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(c)
(1964), which served as the prototype for other special statutory review provisions, in•
cluding the Judicial Review Act of 1950, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-51 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968),
under which the orders of a number of agencies are reviewed.
31. For a classic discussion of the theory and operation of nonstatutory review, see
ATIORNEY GENERAL'S COMM, ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISfRATIVE PROCEDURE
IN GoVl:RNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 80-82 (1941).
32. The leading decisions are Larson v. Domestic 8: Foreign Commerce Corp., 337
U.S. 682 (1949); Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609
(1963); Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57 (1963).
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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

A. The Sovereign Immunity Doctrine
in the Federal Courts
The rule that the United States cannot be sued without its consent developed slowly during the nineteenth century as a tacit assumption rather than a reasoned doctrine. Because federal courts
were not given general federal-question jurisdiction until 1875,38
holdings on the question occurred only infrequently. Attention
centered on the related problem of the immunity of the states from
suit, a subject controlled by the eleventh amendment to the United
States Constitution.84 It was natural to assume that the federal government was entitled by judicial implication to the same protection
accorded the states by constitutional amendment.811 Yet most of the
early statements on federal immunity came in cases advocating a
strict construction of the Court of Claims Act to preclude other contract remedies.86 As late as 1882, Justice Miller-in a pioneer effort
to interpret the scope of the immunity in the light of its purposesobserved that "while the exemption of the United States and of the
several States from being subjected as defendants to ordinary actions
in the courts has ... been repeatedly asserted here, the principle has
never been discussed or the reasons for it given, but it has always
been treated as an established doctrine." 37
At various times it has been stated that the basis of the doctrine
is, first, the traditional immunity of the English sovereign surviving
by implication the constitutional grant of judicial power over "Con33. 18 Stat. 470, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964). The statutory evolution of
federal-question jurisdiction is summarized in H. HART &: H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
CouRTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 727-33 (1953). Hart and Wechsler state that "By
[1875] ••• the doctrine [of sovereign immunity] was firmly established as a verbal
formula without ever having been subjected to serious scrutiny for purposes of deter•
mining its appropriate scope." Id. at 1152.
34. Compare Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (a state held liable to
suit by a citizen of another state or of a foreign country), with Principality of Monaco
v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934) (eleventh amendment forbids a suit against a state
by a foreign sovereign).
35. See, e.g., the dictum of Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821): "The universally received opinion is, that no suit can be
commenced or prosecuted against the United States; that the judiciary act does not
authorize such suits.'' See also Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &: Improvement Co.,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 283-84 (1855) (dictum); Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.)
386 (1850); United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286 (1846).
36. See the cases cited in Justice Gray's dissenting opinion in United States v. Lee,
106 U.S. 196, 227 (1882).
37. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207 (1882). This case is discussed in note 112
infra.
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troversies to which the United States shall be a party"; 38 second, the
inability of the courts to enforce a judgment against the federal executive without its aid; 39 and, third, the "logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes
the law on which the right depends." 40 These conceptual arguments
for sovereign immunity are now totally discredited. The only rationale for the doctrine that is now regarded as respectable by
courts41 and commentators42 alike is that official actions of the Government must be protected from undue judicial interference.
38. See THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 548 CT· Cooke ed. 1961): "It is inherent in the
nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its
consent." In a recent case a federal judge stated that sovereign immunity "rests either
on the theory that the United States is the institutional descendant of the Crown and
enjoys its immunity or on a metaphysical doctrine that there can be no legal right
as against the authority that makes the law." Martyniuk v. Pennsylvania, 282 F. Supp.
252, 255 (E.D. Pa. 1968). Professor Jaffe's dissection of the historical basis of sovereign
immunity concludes that the rubric that the "king cannot be sued without his consent" did not mean that the subject was without remedy. L. JAFFE, supra note 21, at
197. Jaffe states that the petition of right, a remedy available in England against the
Crown, did not survive the American Revolution, and that "a certain amount of latterday dicta" has unfortunately encumbered "the long-established accountability of
government to suit for alleged illegal activity." Id. at 197-98. He argues that the doctrine of sovereign immunity "has never had, and does not have today, much impact
on the judicial control of administrative illegality." Id. at 197.
!19. See Chief Justice Jay's remarks in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 478
(1793), contrasting the power of a federal court to exercise jurisdiction of a suit
against a State with its lack of power over a suit against the United States: "[I]n all
cases of actions against States or individual citizens, the national courts are supported
in all their legal and constitutional proceedings and judgments, by the arm of the
executive power of the United States; but in cases of actions against the United States,
there is no power which the courts can call to their aid." The same reasoning, of
course, would undermine judicial review of the constitutionality of federal legislation.
40. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) Gustice Holmes). Professor
Harry Street has replied: "It is difficult to give to his dicta any meaning beyond the
fact that the law-making authority can exempt any group [in a state] from the operation of a particular law." GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY 9 (1953). See also Pugh, Historical
Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L. REv. 476 (1953). Mr. Joseph
Block, somewhat more charitably, concludes that "the passage of time, with its mutations upon the theory of the role of the State in society, has sapped the strength
from Mr. Justice Holmes' explanation .••." Suits Against Government Officers and the
Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARV. L. REv. 1060, 1061 (1946).
41. Justice Gray defended sovereign immunity on this ground:
[I]t is essential to the common defence and general welfare that the sovereign
should not, without its consent, be dispossessed by judicial process of forts,
arsenals, military posts, and ships of war, necessary to gnard the national existence
against insurrection and invasion; of customs-houses and revenue cutters, employed in the collection of the revenue; or of light-houses and light-ships, established for the security of commerce with foreign nations and among the different
parts of the country.
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 226 (1882) (dissenting opinion). Chief Justice Vinson,
quoting from Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 516 (1840), advanced the
same rationale: "The interference of the Courts with the performance of the ordinary
duties of the executive departments of the government, would be productive of nothing but mischief ••••" Larson v. Domestic &: Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682,
704 (1949).
42. Mr. Joseph Block states that the only explanation
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The soundness of this conclusion becomes apparent when the
rubric that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts is examined against the background of the American institution of judicial review, an institution premised on the notion that the legality
of official conduct-even that of the ultimate sovereign, the legislature-is subject to challenge in the courts when such conduct interferes with legally protected interests of private persons. Thus the
doctrine of sovereign immunity has never had the effect of insulating
official conduct from judicial scrutiny and control. Any other result
would be not only inconsistent with the institution of judicial review
but intolerable as a matter of social policy. Through one device or
another, federal courts have always entertained suits which were
directed against the sovereign in the sense that the proceeding challenged official conduct and sought to require officials either to take
or not to take particular actions. Although not always perceived in
this fashion, largely because of the direction in which the developing doctrine channelled thinking, sovereign immunity has always
been based upon consideration of whether particular conduct should
be reviewable in the courts.
The basic device for circumventing the bar of sovereign immunity was, of course, the "officer's suit."43 In a suit against the
officer as an individual, the plaintiff alleged that the officer's action
or nonaction had interfered with the plaintiff's rights. If the officer,
in an attempt to justify his behavior, sought to depend on the protective mantle of the sovereign, he was allowed to do so only if he
could establish that federal law authorized him to act as he did. If
the harm to the plaintiff could not be justified under federal law,
the officer was "stripped of his official or representative character and
... subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual
conduct.''44 The plaintiff under these circumstances was entitled to
the same relief that he would have received if the defendant were
that seems worthy of consideration as a real policy basis for the doctrine of sovereign immunity today •.. is [the possibility] that the subjection of the state and
federal governments to private litigation might constitute a serious interference
with the performance of their functions and with their control over their respective
instrumentalities, funds, and property.
Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARV. L.
R.Ev. 1060, 1061 (1946). See also Byse, Proposed Reforms in "Nonstatutory" Judicial
Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1479,
1484: "The practical or policy justification of the immunity is avoidance of undue
judicial intervention in the affairs of government."
43. For a classic statement of the rationale of the "officer's suit," see ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S COMM. ON ..ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, .ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOV·
ERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 80-81 (1941).
44. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908).
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a private person who had interfered with the rights of another. By
thus transforming what was in reality a controversy between a private
person and the federal government into one between two private
persons, the courts were able to exert a considerable degree of control over the federal bureaucracy.
Fiction has its purposes in the law as elsewhere. The device of the
officer's suit, with its mystical transformation of a high government
official, acting under color of his authority, into an ordinary private
citizen, allowed the courts to administer a flexible and discriminating control of the burgeoning activities of government. The question of the scope of the officer's authority-and thus of his justification to act as he did-provided the leverage of judicial control.
The absence of direct review of administrative action forced federal
judges to rely on common-law remedies, especially injunction and
mandamus, as remedial tools. The slow growth of the body of law
now known as "administrative law," and much judicial uncertainty
concerning the authority of the courts to participate in administration, formulate policy, or review discretion, favored the relatively
cautious approach of the officer's suit. Treating the officer in the
same way that a private individual was treated was less of an
anachronism in an earlier and simpler age when governmental activities-largely fiscal, promotional, and proprietary in charactermore closely resembled the range of private activities.
Reliance on fiction as a method of accommodating legal institutions to a new role, however, has entailed some long-run costs. The
pursuit of rationality is strained by pretenses that force judges to
treat things other than as they are. When the sovereign immunity
doctrine itself is commonly phrased in terms of whether "the suit, in
effect, is against the sovereign," a conscientious judge, unfamiliar
with the vagaries of history and the fictional character of the rhetoric,
is induced to make a determination as to whether the case involves
important governmental interests. Nearly every case challenging official conduct may be thought to fall within this more realistic
formulation, for in truth all such actions are suits against the Government. The officer is not acting as a private person but as a federal
official. In every case the officer claims the authority to act as he did.
Finally, the interests of the Government are threatened by the lawsuit, a circumstance that justifies the defense of the suit by government lawyers.
Confusing notions about the nature of the sovereign immunity
doctrine add to the difficulty. Is sovereign immunity a matter affecting the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts or a defense on
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the merits or both?45 Is the rule that the United States is an indispensable party in certain actions a separate rule or merely a corollary
of sovereign immunity?46 Is the officer's authority determined in
relation to his particular action or by reference to his general competence to deal with the broad subject matter? A series of Supreme
Court decisions has created so much confusion that clear answers
to these questions are not possible. The resulting patchwork is an
intricate, complex, and not altogether logical body of law. The basic
issue-balancing the public interest in preventing undue judicial
interference with ongoing governmental programs against the desire
to provide judicial review to individuals claiming that the Government has harmed or threatens to harm them-is obscured rather than
assisted by the doctrine of sovereign immunity in its present form.
I. The Law Prior to the Larson Case

An obvious effect of the sovereign immunity doctrine was to
prevent suits against the United States eo nomine except as Congress
had authorized such suits. A complicated body of case law, however,
separated situations in which an individual could obtain relief
45. Justice Gray, dissenting in United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 249 (1882), stated
that sovereign immunity was an "objection to the e.xercise of jurisdiction over the
sovereign or his property ... which, if not suggested by the sovereign" is lost. Justice
Holmes' view that sovereign immunity is derived from the absence of any underlying
obligation of the sovereign (see text accompanying note 40 supra) implies that im•
munity is a defense on the merits, which would also be waived if not asserted. Clear
holdings, however, speak in terms of subject matter jurisdiction and appear to establish the proposition that the immunity of the United States as a defendant cannot be
waived by any law officer or other officer of the United States. Case v. Terrell, 78 U.S.
(11 Wall.) 199 (1871), establishes the obligation of an appellate court on its own motion to raise the issue of the United States immunity, even though the immunity objection is not asserted by government lawyers. See also l\finnesota v. United States, 305
U.S. 382, 388-89 (1939): "Where jurisdiction has not been conferred by Congress, no
officer of the United States has power to give to any court jurisdiction of a suit against
the United States." On the other hand, it is well established that jurisdiction is conferred over the United States when the Attorney General brings suit on behalf of the
United States; and, once the United States has brought suit against a person, the court
may consider counterclaims against the United States to the extent of recoupment and
set-off. See United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940).
46. Professors Hart and Wechsler suggest that considerations controlling whether
a party is indispensable, that is, whether effective relief may be fairly granted in the
party's absence, are more likely to achieve good results than is Block's suggested test
of undue interference with governmental operations. See Byse, Proposed Reforms in
Federal "Nonstatutory" Judidal Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties,
Mandamus, 75 HARv. L. REV. 1479, 1491-93 (1962). These authors apparently think that
it makes a difference whether the problem is viewed as one of immunity or indis•
pensability. On the other hand, Professor Davis asserts that "A statement that the
United States is an indispensable party is the equivalent in substance of a statement
that sovereign immunity bars the suit against the officer. Nothing of substance depends
upon the form of the statement." 3 K. DAVIS, .AD:IUNISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 27.04,
at 558 n.9 (1958).
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against the Government by suing its officer and situations in which
such relief was unavailable. Before Larson v. Domestic and Foreign
Commerce Corporation41 cast new gloom into this dark comer of the
law, however, the general contours of the doctrine were reasonably
clear and could be summarized in a general way.
The most clearly permissible type of action against a government official was that in which (a) the plaintiff sought to enjoin
conduct or threatened conduct which, unless officially justified, would
constitute a common-law tort, and (b) the relief sought could be
given by simply directing the defendant to abstain from what he
was doing or threatening to do. 48 Once the plaintiff alleged facts
that would entitle him to equitable relief against a private citizen,
the fact that the defendant was a government officer did not provide
a complete defense but merely an opportunity for justification. The
sovereign immunity doctrine failed to provide official justification in
two well-recognized kinds of cases: when the officer was held to have
exceeded the authority delegated to him by Congress49 and when the
statute that purported to authorize the officer's act was found to be
unconstitutional.60
When the officer sought to justify an alleged tort by showing
statutory authority, the court could not dispose of the case on the
ground of sovereign immunity without also deciding the issue of
statutory authority. Courts made no attempt to distinguish between
an allegation of error in the performance of generally authorized
duties and an allegation of the violation of a statute. Tortious conduct that involved an erroneous exercise of authority was assumed
to be unauthorized, unless the action was one committed to the defendant's discretion. 51 For example, in Philadelphia Company v.
Stimson 52 a statute authorized the Secretary of War to fix a harbor
line beyond which the building of piers or other works was a misdemeanor. A property owner sued to enjoin the Secretary from
47. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
48. See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
1175 (1953).
49. See, e.g., Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947) ("public officials may become tortfeasors by exceeding the limits of their authority''); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223
U.S. 605, 619-20 (1912); American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S.
94, 109 (1902).
50. See, e.g., Georgia R.R. &: Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 304-06 (1952):
"This Court has long held that a suit to restrain unconstitutional action threatened
by an individual who is a state officer is not a suit against the State." See also Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-60 (1908); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738, 836-37 (1824).
51. See e.g., Mulry v. Driver, 366 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1966).
52. 223 U.S. 605 (1912).

402

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 68:!187

prosecuting him for the construction of a wharf beyond the line the
Secretary had fixed. The Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice
Hughes, granted relief against tortious interference with plaintiff's
use of his land:
The exemption of the United States from suit does not protect
its officers from personal liability to persons whose rights of property they have wrongfully invaded.... The principle has frequently
been applied with respect to state officers seeking to enforce unconstitutional enactments.... And it is equally applicable to a Federal
officer acting in excess of his authority or under an authority not
validly conferred.53

Nonstatutory relief was much more difficult to obtain, however,
when the relief sought fell into any of three special categories: (a)
enforcing of contracts against the United States; (b) directing
government officers to pay over public monies; and (c) directing
officials to transfer property which is in the possession of the United
States and to which the United States unquestionably has legal
title. 54 Each of these situations deserves some special comment.
The immunity of the United States from suits to enforce contracts
against it developed in the context of the similar immunity of the
states under the eleventh amendment. The central notion underlying
the adoption of the eleventh amendment was that a court cannot
without consent enforce a contract against the sovereign. 55 A long
line of cases held that federal courts cannot give an individual
specific performance of a contract with the United States. 50 The provision of a statutory contract remedy against the United States in
the Court of Claims-or in certain instances in a district court,
pursuant to the Tucker Act-was properly viewed as an exclusive
remedy.
A case in which the plaintiff seeks to order a government officer
to pay over public funds in his possession presents a special problem.
53. 223 U.S. at 619-20.
54. Cf. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV.
L. R.Ev. 1, 29 (1963):
Our legal tradition • • • does tell us that the sensitive areas-the areas where
consent to suit is likely to be required-are those involving the enforcement of
contracts, treasury liability for tort, and the adjudication of interests in property
which has come unsullied by tort into the bosom of the government.
55. The eleventh amendment to the Constitution was a direct response to Chisholm
v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), which had held that article III and the Judiciary
Act of 1789 granted jurisdiction of a suit by South Carolina citizens to recover on
bonds that Georgia had confiscated for conduct "inimical to the cause of liberty." See
1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 96-100 (2d ed. 1926).
56. See, e.g., Wells v. Roper, 246 U.S. 335 (1918); Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U.S. 218
(1913); United States v. Jones, 131 U.S. 1 (1889); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 721,
727 (1882).
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Whether the remedy sought is mandamus or injunction, the plaintiff
seeks affirmative relief of a particularly delicate kind. Effective government is dependent upon an ample provision of funds, and an
order requiring the public treasury to disgorge is thought to pose a
substantial threat. Consequently, the circumstances under which a
court may compel the payment of public monies are restricted to
those in which the official lacks discretion and there is a statutory
duty owed to the plaintiff. 57 In Mine Safety Appliances Company v.
Forrestal, 58 for example, a government contractor sought to "restrain" the Secretary of the Navy from withholding payments allegedly due on a contract. The Secretary had withheld payments
pursuant to the Renegotiation Act on the ground that the plaintifl
had made excessive profits; the plaintiff contended that the Secretary's conduct was unauthorized and unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court dismissed the action as one against the United States to which
it had not consented. Although the suit was framed as an action for
a prohibitory injunction, the plaintiff in fact sought to compel the
payment of government funds in a situation in which Congress had
directed that payments not be made. In such a case, the plaintiff's
contract remedy in the Court of Claims was a perfectly adequate one.
On the other hand, when a statute imposes a clear duty upon a
government officer to pay a claimant, mandatory relief is available
in the federal courts. 59 In the leading case of lv[iguel v. ivlcCarl, 60
57. Compare Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. 481, 488 (1925), in which the Court held
that a suit to require officers to sell Indian reservation lands and to distribute the
proceeds to various claimants was barred by sovereign immunity, and United States
ex rel. Hall v. Payne, 254 U.S. 343 (1920), in which the Court held that the discretion
of the Secretary with respect to approval of homestead applications was not subject
to control by mandamus, with such cases as Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37
U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838), in which the Court ordered the Postmaster General to credit
relators with an amount of money.
Mandatory relief is discussed in 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE I.Aw TREATISE §§ 23.09.12 (1958); Developments in the Law-Remedies Against the United States and Its
Officials, 70 HARV. L. REV. 827, 861-64 (1957). Suggestions for "a rational law of mandamus" are made in Byse &: Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of
1962 and "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARV.
L. REv. 308, 331-36 (1967).
58. 326 U.S. 371 (1945).
59. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States, 176 U.S. 221 (1900) (mandamus directing the
Treasurer to make certain payments which an Act of Congress, as construed by the
Court, required him to make); Clackamas County v. McKay, 219 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir.
1954), vacated as moot, 349 U.S. 909 (1955) (mandamus directing the Secretary of the
Interior to distribute to certain counties in Oregon the monetary proceeds received by
him from the sale of land which had reverted to the United States after certain grantee
railroads had forfeited their rights to it; the only action required by the Secretary,
according to the court's construction of the statute, was "ministerial" rather than
"discretionary").
60. 291 U.S. 442 (1934).
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for example, the Supreme Court affirmed a mandatory injunction
against a disbursing officer requiring him to pay a retirement allowance to which the plaintiff was entitled by law. The holding that
the duty was mandatory rather than discretionary was made even
though the Comptroller General had ruled to the contrary on the
question at issue.
Apart from cases in which the United States is named as a party
defendant, the clearest class of cases which were open to the defense
of sovereign immunity under the pre-Larson law were actions to
establish an interest in, or to satisfy a claim out of, property of the
United States, when the United States unquestionably had title and
the property was in possession of its officers or agents. 61 Even in this
situation, however, mandatory relief is available if a statute imposes
on the officer a clear duty in favor of the claimant.62
One situation in which the law was unclear-and remained so
until 1962 when Malone v. Bowdoin63 was decided-was that in
which the plaintiff claims title to specific property and the officer
defends on the ground that title is in the United States. In a venerable
earlier case, United States v. Lee,64 the Supreme Court granted relief
in this situation; but in other cases, the Court had refused to do so,
asserting that the action was against the United States if the property
was in its possession.65
2. The Larson Case-Confusion Compounded

Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corporation 66 signaled a departure from the established contours of sovereign immunity, and the result has been confusion and a further strengthening of the immunity. In that case, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the
War Assets Administrator from selling to a third party a quantity
61. See, e.g., Maricopa County v. Valley Natl. Bank, SIS U.S. 357, 362 (1943); Min•
nesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939): Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 60, 69
(1906); The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 154 (1868).
62. See, e.g., Wilber v. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306 (1930) (mandamus granted directing the Secretary of the Interior to issue a mining patent); Payne
v. Central Pac. Ry., 255 U.S. 228 (1921) (Secretary of the Interior enjoined from interfering with a railroad's selection of indemnity lands, since the Secretary was under
a "plain official duty," without discretion "to substitute his judgment for the will of
Congress'); Lane v. Hoglund, 244 U.S. 174 (1917).
63. 369 U.S. 643 (1962). See text accompany notes 110-17 infra.
64. 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
65. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1913)
("The United States is the owner in possession of the vessel.'); Oregon v. Hitchcock,
202 U.S. 60, 70 (1906) ("Again, it must be noticed that legal title to all these tracts of
land is still in the Government.'); cf. West Coast Exploration Co. v. McKay, 213 F.2d
582, 596 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 989 (1954).
66. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
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of coal, the title to which was alleged to have passed to plaintiff under a disputed contract with the agency. The Court denied injunctive relief in a cloudy opinion by Chief Justice Vinson that attempted
to restate the law of sovereign immunity applicable to suits for a
prohibitory injunction against government officers. Thus it was
said that a suit may be brought against an officer if the officer has
acted "unconstitutionally" or "ultra vires his authority." 67 But, according to the Court, the mere allegation that the officer, "acting
officially," wrongfully holds plaintiff's property, while establishing
a wrong to plaintiff, "does not establish that the officer ... is not
exercising the powers delegated to him by the sovereign." 68 Again,
the Court stated:
a suit may fail, even if it is claimed that the officer being sued has
acted unconstitutionally or beyond his statutory powers, if the relief
requested cannot be granted by merely ordering the cessation of the
conduct complained of but will require affirmative action by the
sovereign or the disposition of unquestionably sovereign property.69
The case itself fell squarely benv-een nv-o conflicting lines of authority. In one, stemming from United States v. Lee10 and Land v.
Dollar,11 injunctive relief had been granted for the tortious withholding of property that had come into the possession of the Government; and in the other, as in Goldberg v. Daniels,12 relief had been
denied when the property claimed by the plaintiff under a contract
had never left the Government's possession. The Court in Larson
could have reached the same result that it did reach either by treating the case as an impermissible attempt to obtain specific performance of a government contract or by holding that the plaintiff's
damage remedy for breach of contract in the Court of Claims was
an adequate and exclusive remedy.
It is surprising that the Larson opinion has had so much influence. The case was decided by a divided Court in an opinion
that had the support of only four Justices. 73 It purported to overrule or narrowly limit several well-established cases, including Land
67. 337 U.S. at 689-90.
68. 337 U.S. at 693.
69. 337 U.S. at 691 n.11.
70. 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
71. 330 U.S. 731 (1947).
72. 231 U.S. 218 (1913).
73. Justice Rutledge concurred only in the result, and Justice Douglas concurred
on the narrow ground that an injunction in the situation presented would interfere
with the surplus property program. Three Justices dissented.

Michigan Law Review

406

[Vol. 68:!18'7

v. Dollar,74 decided only two years before. Nevertheless, the Larson
opinion has been taken as the modern keystone of the sovereign
immunity doctrine.
The Larson opinion has four fundamental defects. (a) It holds
that the official's conduct, even though wrongful, may not be enjoined if he is acting within the general sphere of his authority. (b)
It determines the application of the sovereign immunity doctrine
by the wholly irrelevant test of whether the Government, if it were
a private principal, would be liable for the acts of its agent. (c) It
states that the application of sovereign immunity turns on whether
the suit is "in effect, a suit against the sovereign" thereby leaving the
"government ... stopped in its tracks." 75 (d) It implies that affirmative relief may not be granted against a federal officer. 76 The first
three defects will be considered at this point; the last will be discussed shortly in connection with the case of Hawaii v. Gordon.77
a. "Error" distinguished from "authority." While the Larson
decision allows an injunction suit against a federal officer when it is
shown that the officer's action exceeded his constitutional or statutory authority, "authority" is distinguished sharply from a mistake
of law or fact in exercising a statutory power: "[RJelief can be
granted, without impleading the sovereign, only because of the officer's lack of delegated power. A claim of error in the exercise of
that power is therefore not sufficient." 78 At a later point in the opinion the distinction between action that is erroneous or 1vrongful
("error") and action that is within the officer's general competence
("authority") is repeated:
It is argued that an officer given the power to make decisions is only
given the power to make correct decisions.... There is no warrant
for such a contention in cases in which the decision made by the
officer does not relate to the terms of his statutory authority. Certainly the jurisdiction of a court to decide a case does not disappear if its decision on the merits is wrong. And we have heretofore
rejected the argument that official action is invalid if based on an
incorrect decision as to law or fact, if the officer making the decision
was empowered to do so.79

The Larson opinion is susceptible to the interpretation that the
existence of "statutory authority" need not depend upon a careful
construction of the statute in question; a case should be dismissed
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

330
See
337
See
337
337

U.S. 731 (1947).
337 U.S. at 687, 704.
U.S. at 691 n.11.
text accompanying notes 124-27 infra.
U.S. at 690.
U.S. at 695.
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on sovereign immunity grounds if the officer is acting within his
general sphere of authority even though the particular action would
be statutorily prohibited if the statute were properly interpreted.
Congress, of course, may commit administrative action to agency
discretion, thus foreclosing judicial review except for arbitrary or
capricious action. "The vice of Larson," however, as Professor Byse
has stated, is that it permits-perhaps even encourages-"courts to
shirk the hard task of determining the limits of official power": 80
It is perfectly possible for a court to hold that an official has authority to make erroneous as well as correct determinations. Such a
holding, of course, should rest on a reasoned determination that
Congress intended to confer so broad a discretion. But under Larson
[and its progeny] the courts seem to interpret the statutes cursorily
to authorize the defendant official to act in the "general" area in
question; so long as the official remains within the "general" area,
his erroneous acts are unreviewable whether or not the statute properly construed was intended to confer such an unreviewable discretion. This ... is an abdication of judicial responsibility.81
Numerous decisions of lower federal courts support the proposition that Larson's distinction between "error" and "general authority" has been applied to deprive litigants of judicial consideration of their claim that an officer's conduct is unlawful. In Doehla
Greeting Cards, Incorporated v. Summerfield, 82 for example, users
of the parcel post service brought an action against the Postmaster
General to enjoin him from enforcing increased parcel post zone
rates, alleging that the Postmaster General had failed to comply with
a statutory requirement and that the rate order was arbitrary and
capricious. The court dismissed the action on the ground that the
suit was "one against the United States to which no consent had
been given." 83 The opinion, in relying on Larson, implies that erroneous performance of a statutory duty is the act of the sovereign
and cannot be enjoined. Unlike the situation in Larson, however,
the postal law in question sets forth standards to be observed by the
Postmaster General when fixing rate changes of the sort in question
in Doehla.84 To say that the defendant may not be enjoined despite
80. Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign
Immunity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1479, 1490-91 (1962).
81. Id.
82. 227 F.2d 44 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
83. 227 F.2d at 45.
84. Act of Feb. 28, 1925, ch. 368, § 207, 43 Stat. 1067, as amended, Act of May 29,
1928, ch. 856, § 7, 45 Stat. 942, formerly codified in 39 U.S.C. § 247 (1958), provided that
"if the Postmaster General shall find on experience that [the rates] ••• are such as
••• to permanently render the cost of the service greater than the receipts" he shall,
with the consent of the Interstate Commerce Commission, revise the rates.
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a departure from those standards is to fl.out their very existence.85
The court's failure to construe and apply the statute had the effect
of giving the Postmaster General a wholly unchecked discretion
even though Congress may not have intended to confer unreviewable discretion. 86
Another troublesome case along similar lines is Kennedy v.
Rabinowitz, 81 in which the court refused to consider the plaintiffs'
argument that, under the terms of the Foreign Agents Registration
Act, the Attorney General could not require them to register. The
court held that the general power of the Attorney General "to construe the individual statutes and apply them to the facts before him"
was sufficient to authorize his action and to shield it behind the
sovereign immunity defense.88 On certiorari the Supreme Court
ignored its mm repeated holdings that sovereign immunity is a
jurisdictional issue and proceeded to decide the case against the
plaintiffs on the merits.89 Other cases in which courts have failed to
construe the statute to determine whether Congress intended the
officer to exercise unchecked discretion include Gnotta v. United
States, 00 Wohl Shoe Company v. Wirtz, 91 Fay v. Miller, 92 and Interstate Reclamation Bureau v. Rogers. 93
85. For a similar discussion of the Doehla case, see Byse, supra note 80, at 1489-91;
Comment, Immunity of Government Officers: Effects of the Larson Case, 8 ST.AN. L.
REv. 683 (1956).
86. Manhattan-Bronx: Postal Union v. Gronouski, 350 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1965),
cert. denied sub nom. Manhattan-Bronx: Postal Union v. O'Brien, 382 U.S. 978 (1966),
is similar, although the court there did undertake in an alternative holding to consider
the merits of the claim that the Postmaster General had misconstrued an executive
order dealing with collective bargaining by postal employees.
87. 318 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1963), afjd. on other grounds, 376 U.S. 605 (1964).
88. 318 F.2d at 183 n.9. Judge Fahy, in a persuasive dissent, argued that sovereign
immunity did not prevent the court from passing on the legal authority of the Attorney General to require plaintiffs to register. 318 F.2d at 185-86.
89. 376 U.S. 605 (1964).
90. 415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969), discussed in text accompanying notes 4-10 supra.
91. 246 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Mo. 1965). In this case an employer, who had been
warned that he was in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, and who would be
subject to double liability if he was not exempt, sought a declaration that he was
exempt from the Act. The Court, refusing to interpret the statute, dismissed on the
ground of sovereign immunity:
[A]n officer, while making an authorized determination, is still acting within his
own authority when and if he makes a wrong determination as to whether or not
a party is subject to a particular provision of a valid statute...•
• • • [The Secretary's] determinations are those of the sovereign ••••
246 F. Supp. at 822.
92. 183 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1950), in which the court stated that a United States
Attorney has authority to request a telephone company to discontinue service to a
plaintiff suspected of gambling, even though the Attorney's action might be tortious
and taken without sufficient evidence.
93. 103 F. Supp. 205 (S.D. Tex. 1952), in which the court held that local officials
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b. Reliance on "normal rules of agency." A related defect of
the Larson opinion has also had the effect of greatly increasing the
plaintiff's burden of demonstrating an official departure from statute.
The Court in Larson insisted that a showing of illegality under general law is not sufficient, because the determinative question is
whether the agent's act was that of the United States. According to
the Court, when injunctive relief is sought, the answer to this question depends on whether the officer has "authority" in the sense that
his actions would be regarded as those of a private principal under
the normal rules of agency law.94
The injection of private agency law into questions of sovereign
immunity involves a rather bizarre incongruity. As Professor Byse
has commented, "The incongruous result of the Larson case is that
to the extent the normal rules of agency impose liability on private
principals, governmental officials are immunized from injunctive or
declarative relief. As private liability expands, official responsibility
decreases." 95 The policies relevant to a determination that a private
principal is bound by his agent's act, namely, that the principal controls the agent and profits from his services, are not relevant to the
distinct question of whether a court should pass on the legality of
official conduct. The inquiry merely distracts the mind from a useful consideration of factors relevant to a rational determination of
whether judicial review should be available.
Despite the incongruity of having government nonliability tum
on whether a private principal would be liable, and vice versa,
lower federal courts have sometimes followed the Larson approach.
In Hudspeth County Conservation and Reclamation District No. 1
v. Robbins,96 for example, the court cited Larson and then concluded:
Applying that test, it seems clear to us that if the dams •.. had
been owned by a private corporation whose managers and agents
had violated the rights of the plaintiffs in the manner contended in
this suit, the private corporation could not escape liability for damages on the ground that its employees were acting outside the scope
of their authority.u1
of the Department of Labor have "authority" to investigate and even to harass an
employer in attempts to induce compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act, even
though the employer's business might eventually be found not to be within the
operation of the Act.
94. 337 U.S. 682, 695 (1949).
95. Byse, supra note 80, at 1488.
96. 213 F.2d 425 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 833 (1954).
97. 213 F.2d at 432.
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c. Whether a suit is "in effect, a suit against the sovereign."
Legal fictions may occasionally serve a useful purpose in hastening
a transition to sounder rules of law. In emphasizing the fictional
aspects of the sovereign immunity doctrine, however, the Larson
opinion merely obfuscates the underlying policy considerations. The
Court stated that in each injunction suit
the question is directly posed as to whether, by obtaining relief
against the officer, relief will not, in effect, be obtained against the
sovereign . . . [because] the compulsion . . . may be compulsion
against the sovereign, although nominally directed against the individual officer. If it is, then the suit is barred . . . because it is,
in substance, a suit against the Government ....98

In the 1963 case of Hawaii v. Gordon, 99 the Court repeated this
notion: "The general rule is that relief sought nominally against an
officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate
against the latter." 1 00
The Larson language, restated as the "general rule" in Hawaii
v. Gordon, purports to make the maintenance of the action-and
hence the availability of judicial review-dependent upon whether
"the sovereign" will be affected by the grant of relief against the
officer. There is a difficulty in our system, of course, in identifying
the sovereign and its interests.101 The congressional will embodied in
a statute, when that will is properly interpreted, may be at odds
with the views of the agency. Other branches of the federal government may have different views or interests concerning the same
matter.
Even apart from the difficulty of identifying the sovereign and
its interests, the "general rule" stated by the Court has not been
and cannot be the Iaw. 102 Any suit that challenges official conduct,
98. 337 U.S. at 688.
99. 373 U.S. 57. See text accompanying notes 124-27 infra.
100. 373 U.S. at 58. In Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963), discussed in text
accompanying notes 128-40 infra, the Court said: "The general rule is that a suit is
against the sovereign if 'the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury
or domain, or interfere with the public administration,' or if the effect of the judg•
ment would be 'to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act.'"
(Citations omitted.)
101. See Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947), which identifies the "dominant
interest of the sovereign" not with the officer's desire to be free from judicial control,
but with the citizen's interest in the recovery of property wrongfully withheld.
102. 3 K. DAVIS, .ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 27.01, at 149 (Supp. 1965):
It simply is not and never has been true that federal courts are without power to
enter a judgment which is really against the government••••
• • • Judgments of courts have often expended themselves on the public treasury
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whether or not that suit is cast in the fictional form of the officer's
suit, adversely affects governmental interests if relief is granted.
Besides, the fact that governmental interests are affected has never
been a basis for the denial of relief in such cases. Indeed, the very
purpose for which these suits are brought is to affect governmental
interests. Thus the holding in Greene v. McElroy 103 that the Secretary of Defense acted improperly in withdrawing the security clearance of an employee of a defense contractor, without providing an
opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination, was widely
and properly viewed as requiring extensive changes in the federal
security program.104 Similarly, when the Court held that the Secretary of the Army could not base a serviceman's other-than-honorable
discharge on preinduction activities, 105 the military services were
required to change their existing practices.106 Court decisions requiring a particular affirmative action, such as the approval of an
application for a merchant seaman's certificate107 or the reinstatement
of a federal employee,1°8 often rest on general principles that are
applicable to hundreds or thousands of other persons. In these and
many other cases, 109 judicial review of administrative action has
been cast in the form of an injunction suit against an offending
officer, and relief has not been denied even though vast changes in
governmental policies or practices were required.
or domain, have often interfered with the public administration, and have often
restrained the government from acting or compelled it to act, and judgments of
courts will surely continue to do these things in the future.
Professor Jaffe concludes: "Away with fruitless and unhistorical attempts to determine whether a suit is 'really' against the state." L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 229 (1965).
103. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
104. See Exec. Order No. 10,865, 3 C.F.R. 398 (1959-1963 comp.), which contained
procedural requirements designed to satisfy the Greene case.
105. Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
106. See Everett, Military Administrative Discharges-The Pendulum Swings, 1966
DUKE L.J. 41; Meador, Judicial Determinations of Military Status, 72 YALE L.J. 1293
(1963).
107. See Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968), in which the Court held that a Coast
Guard Commandant was not authorized under the Magnuson Act to inquire into a
mariner's political activities and affiliations in passing upon his application for validation of a mariner's certificate.
108. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959); Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
109. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. ll6 (1958) (holding that the Secretary of State
was not authorized to refuse a passport application for reasons of national security);
Youngstown Sheet &: Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (enjoining seizure of steel
mills under executive order); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123 (1951) (holding that a hearing is necessary before the Attorney General can place
an organization on a list of subversive organizations).
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3. Property Disputes Between the United States
and Private Persons
Another major case in which the Supreme Court recently has
strengthened the hold of the sovereign immunity doctrine is Malone
v. Bowdoin. 110 In that case, sovereign immunity was held to bar an
action to eject a Forest Service officer from land owned by the plaintiffs. Under Larson, the Court said, an officer may not be sued, even
for the return of property wrongfully taken or held, unless his action
was outside his statutory powers, or unless those powers, or their
exercise in the particular case, were constitutionally void. 111 There
was no allegation of either kind in Malone. Larson, the Court added,
had limited United States v. Lee112 to cases in which there is a claim
that the administrative action constituted "an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation."113 Moreover, according
to the Malone opinion, Lee had been decided when there was no
money remedy for the Government's taking, and in the present case
the Court of Claims was open.114
The Court's reasoning in Malone, however, was faulty. If Congress had authorized Forest Service officers to seize private property
and had limited the owner's remedy to a damage action in the Court
of Claims, the procedure would have been constitutional even though
harsh. But Congress has not authorized Forest Service officers to
seize private land without resort to condemnation procedure and
the damage remedy in a distant forum is not a totally adequate
remedy.115 Professor Davis has criticized the Malone case as "patently
unsound" because, even though it was assumed for purposes of appeal that the fee was in the plaintiff, the court refused to assume
110. 369 U.S. 643 (1962).
111. 369 U.S. at 647, quoting from 337 U.S. at 702.
112. 106 U.S. 196 (1882). The Lee case involved a dispute over the ownership of
the Arlington estate of General Robert E. Lee's wife, which had been purchased by
the United States for an alleged default in taxes. Since a proffer of the taxes had been
improperly rejected by the tax officials, the sale was invalid. The Supreme Court held
that the owners were entitled to ejectment against the federal officers who were in pos•
session of the property, since otherwise an unconstitutional taking would result.
Legitimate governmental interests could be protected by the power of eminent domain.
113. 369 U.S. at 648, quoting from 337 U.S. at 697.
114. 369 U.S. at 647 n,8, relying on United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267
(1946).
115. Justice Douglas, in a dissenting opinion, argued that
[e]jectment ••• is the classic form of action to try title. It takes place in the
locality where the land is located. No judges are better qualified to try it than
the local judges.••• If [the United States] is aggrieved by the state or federal
court ruling on title, ••• [e]minent domain-with the power to take possession
immediately-is available.
369 U.S. 643, 650 (1962).
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that government officers are not authorized to withhold land from
its lawful owner.116 "But instead of making these obvious assumptions, the Court made the opposite assumptions, by saying merely
that the plaintiff had not asserted that the officer was exceeding his
delegated powers.'' 117 More consistent with the general preference
for judicial control of administrative excesses would have been the
presumption that, absent an affirmative showing of authority, an
officer who takes or withholds land belonging to a plaintiff does so
without authority.
In a number of recent cases, Malone has been applied to deny
district courts jurisdiction to consider land disputes between the
United States and adjacent property owners.118 In Gardner v. Harris,m the plaintiff's predecessor-in-title had sold the United States
land which became part of the Natchez Trace Parkway. The conveyance had been subject to an access easement, but the federal
officer in charge of the parkway erected barricades across the rightof-way. In an injunction suit seeking removal of the barricades, it
was held that sovereign immunity barred the action. Chief Judge
Brown reasoned that the judgment would compel the Government
to act and would interfere with public administration and hence
that suit could be brought only if the superintendent had exceeded
his statutory powers. Since the statute authorizing the superintendent to administer and maintain the Natchez Trace Parkway did
not contain any express limitation on the superintendent's powers
of administration, Chief Judge Brown concluded that "[m]erely because the Superintendent may have been acting wrongfully in interfering with plaintiff's access to the highway ... does not amount to
circumstances fulfilling the exception that the officer must be acting
beyond his statutory powers." 120
116. 3 K. DAVIS, AD:-1INISTRATIVE LAw 'TREATISE § 27.01, at 147 (Supp. 1965).
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Simons v. Vinson, 394 F.2d 732 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 968
(1968) (suit to try title to land formed by accretion along a river which formed the
boundary between land owned by the United States and land owned by plaintiffs;
action by plaintiffs held to be barred by sovereign immunity); Switzerland Co. v. Udall,
337 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965) (similar to Gardner v.
Harris, discussed in the text); Andrews v. White, 121 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Tenn. 1954),
affd. per curiam, 221 F.2d 790 (6th Cir. 1955) (suit by a landowner to enjoin federal
officers from enforcing hunting regnlations in what might have been part of a national
park; action held to be barred by sovereign immunity). But see Zager v. United States,
256 F. Supp. 396 (E.D. Wis. 1966) (quiet-title action to determine whether a mistake
had been made in the original land survey; action held not barred by sovereign immunity).
119. 391 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1968).
120. 391 F.2d at 888.
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The Gardner decision is the logical offspring of Larson and
Malone, but the result is indefensible. When government officers
mistakenly seize or hold private property, such mistakes both deprive
persons of specific property and subject the United States to liability.
The relevant question should be whether Congress has authorized
the seizure or condemnation of private property under the circumstances that existed. In the absence of such authorization, the property owner should not be limited to a damage remedy under the
Tucker Act and injunctive relief should be available. 121 The courts
should assume that Congress intends that officers who deal with
property should keep within their powers in taking and withholding
property that is claimed by private persons. 122 Unless a vital regulatory program is involved, Congress would probably prefer a prohibitory injunction to a grant of compensation after the fact.

4. Affirmative Relief
A footnote to the Larson opinion contained a troublesome
dictum that, even though the officer who is sued has acted unconstitutionally or beyond his powers,
a suit may fail, as one against the sovereign, . . . if the relief requested cannot be granted by merely ordering the cessation of the
conduct complained of but will require affirmative action by the
sovereign or the disposition of unquestionably sovereign property.123

Although the language of the dictum makes the denial of relief
permissive rather than mandatory, its failure to indicate any factors
to be considered in determining whether affirmative relief is appropriate suggests that mandatory relief cannot be granted.
The recent Supreme Court decision in Hawaii v. Gordon 124 has
strengthened the erroneous notion that affirmative relief may not be
granted against government officers. That case involved provisions
121. This position underlies Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947):
[PJublic officials may become tortfeasors by exceeding the limits of their authority.
And where they unlawfully seize or hold a citizen's realty or chattels, recoverable
by appropriate action at law or in equity, he is not relegated to the Court of
Claims to recover a money judgment. The dominant interest of the sovereign is
then on the side of the victim who may bring his possessory action to reclaim
that which is wrongfuIIy withheld.
122. In Simons v. Vinson, 394 F.2d 732 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 968 (1968),
the United States wanted the land in dispute, not for a public purpose, as in Malone
and in Gardner v. Harris, but merely because oil had been discovered. A dissenting
judge, having in mind that the United States could not condemn land merely to collect oil royalties from it, said: "The Constitution commands that [the plaintiffs] shall
have the property." 394 F.2d at 738. See text accompanying note 270 infra.
123. 337 U.S. 682, 691 n.11 (1949).
124. 373 U.S. 57 (1963). See text accompanying notes 99-108 supra.
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of the Hawaii Statehood Act which provided that if the President
should decide that certain federal properties were no longer needed
by the United States, he must convey them to the State of Hawaii.
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget, acting for the President,
advised federal agencies that this authorization related only to lands
that had been ceded to the United States by Hawaii. The State of
Hawaii filed an original action in the Supreme Court to compel the
Director to withdraw his advice, to determine whether certain property he had excluded was "needed," and, if it was not needed, to
convey it to Hawaii. The Supreme Court dismissed the suit in a
brief per curiam opinion, stating:
[R]elief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the
sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter. [Citing
Dugan v. Rank, Malone v. Bowdoin, and Larson.] Here the order
requested would require the Director's official affirmative action,
affect the public administration of government agencies and cause
as well the disposition of property admittedly 'belonging to the
United States.125

Professor Davis argues that the "issue was not whether the lands
should be conveyed-for that question was solely for the President
-but whether a report should be made to the President with respect
to designated lands.... Thus, the sole question was one of statutory
interpretation."126 A federal officer, of course, cannot be ordered by
a court to exercise discretion in a particular way. But if a statute
requires an officer to exercise discretion and the officer refuses to
make the discretionary determination, a court can interpret the
statute and require him to exercise discretion.127 Mandatory relief
has been granted against federal officers for many years under such
circumstances, and Hawaii v. Gordon muddies the waters by suggesting that affirmative relief is always barred by sovereign immunity.

5. Undue Interference with Governmental Discretion
Fictions aside, the application of the sovereign immunity doc•
trine should rest on whether the benefits of judicial review of administrative action are outweighed by the possible interference with
governmental programs that may result from the grant of relief.
Dugan v. Rank 128 involved this question and reached the correct
125.
126.
127.
128.

373 U.S. at 58.
3 K. DAVIS, Am,nNISrRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 27.01, at 148 (Supp. 1965).
See cases cited at notes 58-65 supra.
372 U.S. 609 (1963).
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result. Dugan was a suit to enjoin the United States and officers of
its Bureau of Reclamation from impounding water behind Friant
Dam, a part of the Central Valley Project in California, on the
ground that this action interfered with the plaintiffs' rights to the
use of the water dmmstream. The Supreme Court held that the
United States had not consented to this kind of suit despite the
McCarran Amendment,129 and that the suit against the Reclamation
officers must be dismissed as, in substance, one against the United
States. To enjoin storage of water would require the abandonment
of much of the project and "[t]he Government would, indeed, be
'stopped in its tracks' "; 130 to order construction of subsidiary dams
to meet the plaintiffs' needs would "not only 'interfere with the
public administration' but also 'expend itself on the public treasury.' " 131 The Court stated that the only exceptions to the rule
against suits producing these effects-the exceptions announced in
Larson and 1\1alone-were inapplicable, for the Government "had
the power, under authorization of Congress, to seize the property of
the respondents ... , and this power of seizure was constitutionally
permissible ... .''132
Unlike other recent Supreme Court opinions discussed in this
Article, the Dugan opinion did interpret and resolve the applicable
statute, holding that Congress had authorized physical seizure of the
water and had limited the relief available to affected persons to the
damage remedy under the Tucker Act. Moreover, the Court's conclusion is supported by the practical consideration that interference
with reclamation projects would have resulted if the contrary argument had been accepted.
The Dugan opinion, however, like those in Hawaii v. Gordon 133
and Malone v. Bowdoin, 134 goes beyond what was necessary, when
it states that sovereign immunity is applicable whenever " 'the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain,
or interfere with the public administration,' ... or if the effect of
129. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1964). The 1'.fcCarran Act provides that the United States may
be joined in suits "for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system
or other source," and has been held to be applicable only to cases involving a general
adjudication of all water rights on a given stream, not to private suits between the
plaintiff and the United States. See 372 U.S. at 618.
130. 372 U.S. at 621.
131. 372 U.S. at 621.
132. 372 U.S. at 622.
133. 373 U.S. 57 (1963).
134. 369 U.S. 643 (196!?.
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the judgment would be 'to restrain the government from acting, or
to compel it to act.' " 135 As Professor Davis has argued, such sweeping language is highly misleading:
This so-called general rule never has been the general rule and is not
likely to become the general rule. Judgments of courts have often
expended themselves on the public treasury or domain, have often
interfered with the public administration, and have often restrained
the government from acting or compelled it to act, and judgments
of courts will surely continue to do these things in the future. 136

Indeed, many of the leading decisions of the Supreme Courtthat striking down the National Industrial Recovery Act,137 that setting aside the President's seizure of the steel mills,138 that invalidating federal loyalty and security programs139-"stop the government in
its tracks" or "interfere with public administration." Yet none of
these cases was held to be barred by sovereign immunity even though
the effect on federal programs was much more dramatic than is the
very limited interference that is entailed when a single officer is
claiming a piece of land and the Government has no special program
with respect to that land.140

B. Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity
Today, even more than in the 1950's, it is true that "the Supreme
Court in modern times has ... tended actually to enlarge the scope
of sovereign immunity, out of misapprehension of its historical
foundations . . . ."141 The Court now seems to regard it as settled
that the general contours of the doctrine were established in Larson
v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corporation. 142 Since there is
no discernible pressure for change emanating from the Supreme
Court, 143 the impetus for reform must come from Congress. The
135. 372 U.S. at 620.
136. 3 K. DAVIS, .ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 27.01, at 149 (Supp. 1965).
137. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
138. Youngstown Sheet&: Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952),
139. See cases cited in notes 103-09 supra.
140. See, e.g., Simons v. Vinson, 394 F.2d 732 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 968
(1968), discussed in note 155 infra, and in text accompanying note 270 infra.
141, H. HART&: H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM ll51
{1953).
142. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
143. The Supreme Court could eliminate the sovereign immunity problem in
judicial review of federal administrative action by a swift stroke of the pen. All that
would be required is a holding that § IO(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act
{APA), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), means what it says: "A person
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by
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failure of the courts to develop a sound jurisprudence in this area
argues in favor of a legislative solution. Moreover, important questions of policy, appropriate for legislative judgment, are involved
and a legislative approach to the problem is desirable.
The need for statutory reform of sovereign immunity rests
fundamentally on the belief that the doctrine hinders a rational
determination of basic issues of the availability, the timing, or the
form of judicial review of administrative action. Sovereign immunity as a barrier to judicial review of administrative action
should be eliminated, but without othenvise affecting the availability or timing of judicial review. This beneficial step can be taken
without expanding the liability of the United States for money damages and without displacing congressional judgments, embodied in
various statutes, that a particular remedy should be the exclusive
remedy in a given situation.
I. Need for Reform
a. Inadequacy of existing law. The gist of the argument thus
far has been that the law of sovereign immunity, as elaborated in a
number of fairly recent cases, is illogical, confusing, and erratic. The
available materials, already discussed at length, permit no other
conclusion.
Moreover, the conclusion is not a novel one. Dissatisfaction with
the present doctrine of sovereign immunity is widespread. Professors
Byse and Davis have argued persuasively that the sovereign immunity doctrine constitutes a barrier to proper judicial analysis; and
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof." It would not be a difficult feat of construction to interpret this language as
constituting a limited consent to sue. The Larson case and Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S.
609 (1963), could be distinguished as holdings falling within the APA exception "to
the extent that-(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). To be sure, the
reference in § lO(b) of the Act, as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 703 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), to
"action[s] ••• in a court of competent jurisdiction" carries an implication that the
Act does not vest subject matter jurisdiction in federal district courts when the general
federal-question provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964)-or an applicable special federalquestion provision-is not satisfied. Nevertheless, the reference does not foreclose the
argument that Congress intended federal agencies, as defined by the APA, to be subject to suit in accordance with the provisions of the Act without regard to the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. A holding of this nature, however, would require the Court to
overrule Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512 (1952), which held that the APA did not
authorize a suit against the Civil Service Commission by name. In that case, the Court
stated that "the Act [is not] to be deemed an implied waiver of all governmental
immunity from suit." 342 U.S. at 516. The Blackmar case has been followed by lower
courts. See, e.g., Choumos v. United States, 335 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1964). But see
IWW v. Clark, 385 F.2d 687, 693 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 948 (1968),
holding that "[i]f consent to suit there must be, consent there here is" because of § 10
of the APA.
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each has proposed a remedial statute.144 Professor Jaffe has demonstrated the flimsiness of the doctrine's historical underpinnings and
has agreed with Byse and Davis that legislative reform is desirable.145
Milton Carrow, a prolific writer on administrative law subjects, concludes that "[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity has long fulfilled
the requirements for 'full abandonment.' " 146 He quotes Professor
Walter Gellhorn as stating that
today the doctrine may be satisfactory to technicians but not at all
to persons whose main concern is with justice. . . . The trouble
with the sovereign immunity doctrine is that it interferes with consideration of practical matters, and transforms everything into a
play on words.147

No scholar, so far as can be ascertained, has had a good word for
sovereign immunity for many years.
This rare unanimity of legal scholarship, however, has not been
echoed in court opinions except for recurrent admissions that the
subject is a confusing one and that it is not " 'an easy matter to reconcile all of the decisions of the Court in this class of cases.' " 148
Judicial dissatisfaction with current law, however, has not led to
pressures for judicial reconsideration, for lower court judges are
144. Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign
Immunity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1479 (1962); 3 K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE ch. 27 (1958, Supp. 1965). The Byse proposal differed
from the proposal advanced here in three respects: it took the form of an amendment
of the Judicial Code rather than of the Administrative Procedure Act (see p. 430
infra); it required the action to be cast in the form of a suit against the officer
(see text accompanying notes 326-31 infra); and it provided an exception of uncertain extent for situations in which "the relief requested would affect the title of
property belonging to the United States or would compel the disbursement of funds
belonging to the United States." Professor Byse has subsequently abandoned his
proposal in favor of that adopted by the Administrative Conference of the United
States and advanced herein. The Davis proposal differed primarily in that it sought to
state considerations that should govern the availability of specific review (see text accompanying note 210 infra). Professor Davis now prefers a proposal similar in nature
to that advanced here but requiring the suit to be brought against the United States
(see text accompanying notes 329-31 infra).
145. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 197-98, 213-31, 229
n.123 (1965).
146. Sovereign Immunity in Administrative Law-A New Diagnosis, 9 J. Ptra. L. 1,
22 (1960).
147. Id. See also D. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute
(pt. II), 36 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 268, 290 (1969): "Some day Congress should ••• make a
more rational and more liberal reconciliation of individual protection and government elbow-room in suits to enjoin federal officers than that established by the
benighted Larson decision and its sequels."
148. Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354, 359 (1941), quoting from Cunningham v. Macon
Be Brunswick R.R., 109 U.S. 446, 451 (1883). See also Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643,
646 (1962).

420

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 68:887

bound by Supreme Court precedents149 and the high Court has not
undertaken to reconsider its handiwork.
It is time for Congress to reassert the fundamental proposition
stated by Justice Miller in 1882: "Courts of justice are established,
not only to decide upon controverted rights· of the citizens as against
each other, but also upon rights in controversy between them and
the government . . . .''150
b. Harmful consequences of present law. Law that is confused,
artificial, and erratic is likely to produce unjust results as well as
wasted effort. The doctrine of sovereign immunity fulfills these unpleasant expectations by distracting attention from the real issues
of whether judicial review or specific relief should be available in a
particular situation and by directing attention to the sophistries,
false pretenses, and unreality of present law.
If problems related to sovereign immunity arose infrequently,
it would be possible to regard the defects and wastefulness of the
doctrine with a degree of equanimity. The litigating practice of the
Department of Justice, however, ensures that sovereign immunity
arguments are presented in hundreds of cases each year. The Department asserts sovereign immunity, usually as one of a battery of
grounds for dismissal of a plaintiff's complaint, in a substantial portion of the cases involving nonstatutory review of federal administrative action. Only if tradition or holdings make it absolutely clear
that the suit against the officer is an appropriate form of judicial
review, as in the case of Post Office fraud orders, 151 is the defense
not asserted. This practice was recently criticized by Judge Friendly,
who said: "[L]aw officers of the Government ought not to take up
the time of busy judges or of opposing parties by advancing an
argument so plainly foreclosed by Supreme Court decisions." 152
149. See the opinion of Judge Brown in Gardner v. Harris, 391 F.2d 885 (5th Cir.
1968), reluctantly following the Malone case in holding that sovereign immunity
barred a landowner's claim that a federal officer was wrongfully denying him access to
his land:
With so much done •.. to give the citizen access to a home-based Federal Court,
frequently in cases that involve millions of dollars or which affect comprehensive
programs, the persistence with which the Government successfully asserts im·
munity as to property claims . • . [is] unusual . • • • ['I]hat Congress does not
ameliorate these !l.ardships appears even more unusual •••• And not even equity
-the King's conscience-can help.
391 F.2d at 886-87 &: n.3.
150. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882).
151. See, e.g., American School of Magnetic Healing v. l\IcAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94
(1902), in which the Court allowed nonstatutory review of a Post Office fraud order.
It stated that when "an official violates the law to the injury of an individual the
courts generally have jurisdiction to grant relief." 187 U.S. at 108.
152. Toilet Goods Assn. v. Gardner, 360 F.2d 677, 683 n.6 (2d Cir. 1966), afld., 887
U.S. 158 (1967).
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Despite this statement, however, the confusion in the case law provides justification for the use of a sovereign immunity argument by
government lawyers, who are as eager to win their cases as are other
lawyers. Busy district judges, less familiar than Judge Friendly with
the intricacies of nonstatutory review, are often led to deny a hearing on the merits to some litigants who should receive one. Indeed,
the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962,153 by allowing nonstatutoryreview actions to be brought in the plaintiff's home district rather
than solely in the District of Columbia, has had the effect of exposing
all federal judges to a highly intricate specialty of federal law that
had previously been mastered by only a few.
An argument occasionally made in defense of sovereign immunity
is that it has been so undermined by the suit against the officer that
it no longer serves as a barrier to judicial review, except in cases
involving Treasury liability for damages or involving the disposition
of government property-cases which are arguably deserving of
special treatment. It is true that lawyers and judges who have had
considerable experience with sovereign immunity usually have little
difficulty in sidestepping the doctrine when governmental regulatory
or enforcement activity is challenged. These lawyers read Larson
narrowly, as essentially concerned with the forced disposition of
property held by the Government, in situations in which the particular conduct of the official-though it may be tortious or wrongful
toward the private claimant-is authorized by statute. So read,
Larson does not stand in the way of a suit against an officer who is
engaged in a regulatory or enforcement activity not involving government property, and who is alleged to have acted unlawfully.
This narrow reading of Larson, even if correct, is by no means
universally accepted, and the broader Larson formulations have frequently led lower courts astray. The "error-authority" distinction
of Larson encourages courts to avoid a healthy examination of
official power, 154 and application of the doctrine to land dispute
cases restricts the aggrieved landowner to an often inadequate
remedy-the damage action in a distant forum.1 55 Narrower and
153. 28 U.S.C. §§ l361, 139l(e) (1964), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 139I(e) (Supp. IV,
1965-1968).
154. See cases cited in notes 82-93 supra.
155. See, e.g., Simons v. Vinson, 394 F.2d 732 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 968
(1968), involving a dispute over ownership of accreted land on which oil was being
produced. Application of sovereign immunity prevented a judicial determination of
title and allowed the Government to retain the land even though its condemnation
power probably would not have been available. A subsequent damage action against
the United States, stating a claim for trespass under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
survived on appeal a motion to dismiss. Simons v. United States, 413 F.2d 531 (5th Cir.
1969). See also text accompanying note 270 infra.
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more refined formulations are necessary and legislation is required
for this task.
Furthermore, the application of the artificialities of Larson is not
restricted to cases involving government property or funds. A partial
sampling of recent cases reveals that sovereign immunity has been
a serious issue in numerous suits challenging governmental regulatory and enforcement activities. Those suits have included challenges
to agricultural regulation, 156 food and drug regulation, 1117 administration of federal grant-in-aid programs,158 control of subversive activities,159 administration of labor legislation,160 governmental employ156. Garvey v. Freeman, 263 F. Supp. 573 (D. Colo. 1967), affd., 397 F.2d 600 (10th
Cir. 1968) (sovereign immunity did not bar judicial review of a determination of
normal wheat yields per acre); Gregory v. Freeman, 261 F. Supp. 362 (N.D.N.Y. 1966)
(sovereign immunity barred the claim that officials had erred in determining that
petitioner was not in compliance with the feed grain program); Moon v. Freeman, 245
F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Wash. 1965), affd. on other grounds, 379 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1967)
(sovereign immunity barred suit by wheat processors to enjoin a wheat marketing
export program and to recover funds already paid).
157. Toilet Goods Assn. v. Gardner, 360 F.2d 677, 683 (2d Cir. 1966), affd. on other
grounds, 387 U.S. 158 (1967) (sovereign immunity does not bar a pre-enforcement challenge of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) color additive regulations by cosmetic
manufacturers); American Dietaids Co. v. Celebrezze, 317 F.2d 658 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963) (sovereign immunity barred an action to recover tapes of a
concealed tape recorder used by inspectors of the FDA during an inspection); Sugarman v. Forbragd, 267 F. Supp. 817, 826-27 (N.D. Cal. 1967), afjd., 405 F.2d 1189 (9th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969) (sovereign immunity barred the challenge
of an FDA determination that coffee beans could not be imported); Durovic v. Palmer,
CCH FDC L. REP. ,I 40,099 (N.D. III.), affd. on other grounds, 342 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 820 (1965) (sovereign immunity barred a suit to enjoin an FDA
inspection of a facility producing Krebiozen).
158. Dermott Special School Dist. v. Gardner, 278 F. Supp. 687 (E.D. Ark. 1968)
(sovereign immunity did not bar a school district's challenge of guidelines of the
Department of Health, Education &: Welfare (HEW) establishing requirements for
federally aided programs); Lee County School Dist. v. Gardner, 263 F. Supp. 26 (D.S.C.
1967) (sovereign immunity did not bar the challenge of a deferral by HEW of payment of federal funds to school district); cf. CORE v. Commissioner, Social Security
Administraton, 270 F. Supp. 537 (D. Md. 1967) (sovereign immunity barred a suit to
require an agency to establish an administrative procedure different from that already
established pursuant to an executive order concerning equal opportunity in federal
employment).
159. Kennedy v. Rabinowitz, 318 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1963), afjd. on other grounds,
376 U.S. 605 (1964) (sovereign immunity barred an action by attorneys representing
Cuba for a declaration that the Foreign Agents Registration Act did not require them
to register); IWW v. Clark, 385 F.2d 687, 693 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
948 (1948) (sovereign immunity did not bar an organizaton's challenge to its listing in
"Attorney General's List'?•
160. Rogers v. Skinner, 201 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1953) (sovereign immunity barred an
action to determine whether plaintiff's employees were covered by the Fair Labor
Standards Act); Wohl Shoe Co. v. Wirtz, 246 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Mo. 1965) (sovereign
immunity barred an action seeking a declaration that an employer, warned by officers
that it was violating the Fair Labor Standards Act, was within designated exemptions);
Capital Coal Sales v. Mitchell, 164 F. Supp. 161 (D.D.C. 1958), affd. sub nom. George v.
Mitchell, 282 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (sovereign immunity did not bar the challenge
of the blacklisting of a government contractor for the alleged violation of the Walsh-
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ment,161 postal-rate matters,162 and tax investigation.163 In each of
these cases the Government urged dismissal-often successfully-on
sovereign immunity grounds. No claim is made that the cases were all
improperly decided; in fact, alternative grounds for dismissal were
mentioned or were present in many of them, and it is likely that the
Government often would have prevailed even if the merits had been
reached. But it cannot be asserted with confidence that all of the
results were just; some meritorious claims may have been rejected
out-of-hand by dismissals based on sovereign immunity grounds.
Moreover, apart from the correctness of ultimate disposition, consideration of sovereign immunity diverted both litigants and judges
from more useful inquiries and resulted in wasted time and effort.
The large role that sovereign immunity has played in suits seeking judicial review of public land determinations has been a special
source of injustice, uncertainty, and wasted effort. Unlike more
recently created administrative functions, the older administrative
activity which is involved in regulating the use or disposition of
public lands is, with rare exceptions, not subject to specific statutory
review provisions. Consequently, a litigant challenging an administrative determination in the public-land area is required to seek
Healey Act); Interstate Reclamation Bureau v. Rogers, 103 F. Supp. 205 (S.D. Tex.
1952) (sovereign immunity barred an action to determine whether plaintiff's employees
were covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act).
161. Leber v. Canal Zone Central Labor Union, 383 F.2d llO (5th Cir. 1967), revg.
Canal Zone Central Labor Union v. Fleming, 246 F. Supp. 998 (D.CZ. 1965), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1046 (1968) (sovereign immunity barred an attack on regulations decreasing overseas differential pay); Mulry v. Driver, 366 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1966)
(sovereign immunity barred a suit attacking the validity of a Veterans' Administration
regulation prohibiting physicians, dentists, and nurses from engaging in outside
practice-on the ground that the regulation was authorized); Manhattan-Bronx Postal
Union v. Gronouski, 350 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966)
(sovereign immunity barred a suit challenging the Postmaster General's refusal to
recognize the plaintiff union as the exclusive bargaining representative of certain postal
employees). See also American Guaranty Corp. v. Burton, 380 F.2d 789 (1st Cir. 1967)
(sovereign immunity barred a challenge of the validity of a regulation fixing the fees
for salaries and expenses of referees in bankruptcy).
162. Summerfield v. Parcel Post Assn., 280 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (sovereign immunity barred a challenge of the validity of increased parcel post rates); Doehla
Greeting Cards, Inc. v. Summerfield, 227 F.2d 44 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (same).
163. Reisman v. Caplin, 317 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1963), affd. on other grounds, 375
U.S. 440 (1964) (sovereign immunity barred suit by a taxpayer's attorneys seeking injunctive and declaratory relief from a summons of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
calling for production of allegedly privileged matter, including the work product of
the attorneys); Balistrieri v. United States, 303 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1962) (sovereign immunity barred a taxpayer from obtaining a declaration that he was entitled to examine
documents relevant to tax liability, which the IRS had subpoenaed from an accountant): Smith v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 803 (D.N.J. 1966), appeal dismissed,
377 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1967) (sovereign immunity did not bar a motion by taxpayers to
suppress evidence obtained from them by an IRS agent allegedly in violation of their
constitutional rights).
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nonstatutory review under the general law governing the federal
judicial system. In order to avoid the sovereign immunity doctrine,
the suit must be brought against the official rather than against the
Government itself. But even that may not suffice when the judgment
sought would directly provide for the disposition of government
property.164 A literal application of the prohibition of a decree ordering a transfer of government property would foreclose nearly all
suits against public-land officials, a result that would be unjust as
well as inconsistent with a long history of limited judicial review
in the public-land area. 165 In addition, the absence of statutory
review provisions has created pressure to view section 10 of the
Administrative Procedure Act166 as a jurisdictional provision and as
a consent to suit. 167 The result is a great deal of confusion. A recent
study prepared for the Public Land Law Review Commission by a
group of scholars headed by Professor McFarland stated tl1at
suits in the nature of review actions [against public land officials]
often have been permitted.... When they are permitted notwithstanding, and when forbidden because of, the sovereign immunity
doctrine is admittedly difficult if not impossible to determine on the
basis of the court opinions. . . . [T]he precedents baffi.e lawyers,
tempt government counsel, and feed the despair of commenators.168
The study concludes that "a simple statutory affirmation of the right
to court review would seem to be a dire necessity and should pose no
threat to legitimate public land administration." 169 The report cautions that "because court review is severely limited at best" under the
general law of judicial review codified in the Administrative Procedure Act, abolition of sovereign immunity will not be "disruptive,
costly, and time consuming in operation."170
164. See, e.g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
See text accompanying notes 61-65, 110-22 supra.
165. See, e.g., Clackamas County v. McKay, 219 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1954), vacated
as moot, 349 U.S. 909 (1955); West Coast Exploration Co. v. McKay, 213 F.2d 582 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 989 (1954).
166. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ '701-06 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
167. Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1959).
168. C. McFARLAND, .ADllllNISTRATIVE PROCEDURES AND THE PUBLIC l.ANDs--A R:£1.>0RT
PREPARED FOR THE PUBLIC LAND LAW REvrEW COllf.llllSSION 187-88 (1969).
169. Id. at 305.
170. Id. at 305-06. The report expresses confidence that judicial review would
produce benefits: "[I]t could operate to firm up administrative procedures, instill confidence in those who have or seek rights to develop public land resources, and afford
at least a theoretical protection for the small operator who traditionally has difficulty
in dealing with officialdom." Id.
Although the Public Land Law Review Commission will not submit its final
report until mid-1970, there is every indication that the Commission will accept the
recommendations of its study staff.
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c. Adequacy of the law of judicial review in protecting governmental interests. The partial elimination of sovereign immunity as a
barrier to nonstatutory judicial review of federal administrative action will not expose the Government to undue judicial interference
with administration. The substantial and growing body of law that
governs the availability, timing, and scope of judicial review offers
a more discriminating and rational solution to that objective.
The most fundamental objection to the present sovereign immunity doctrine is that it obfuscates the real issues, which are
whether particular governmental activity should be subject to judicial review, and, if so, what form of relief is appropriate. Examination of cases in which sovereign immunity is invoked demonstrates
that consideration of these central issues is hindered rather than
advanced by the sovereign immunity doctrine. The more discriminating rules and doctrines of judicial review, although flexible by nature
and requiring judgment in their application, have the great virtue
of directing the mind to considerations that are relevant to the
questions of whether judicial review should be available and whether
a particular form of relief is appropriate.
Many of the cases decided on sovereign immunity grounds in
fact involve the question whether a particular activity is unreviewable because "committed to agency discretion by law."171 Others are
situations in which it is arguable that "statutes preclude judicial
review" in whole or in part.172 Still others involve problems of the
timing of suit-prematurity, ripeness, or failure to exhaust administrative remedies173-or of the plaintiff's lack of standing.174
All of the cases could be decided with greater ease and better results
if attention were directed to these questions and not to the confusing metaphysics of sovereign immunity.
It must be borne in mind that the sovereign immunity doctrine
became established about one hundred years ago, long before the
modern law of judicial review had developed. The courts at that
time assumed that they must choose between performing executive
171. See, e.g., Sergeant v. Fudge, 238 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
937 (1957) (discontinuance of post office by Postmaster General). See generally Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion,"
82 HARV. L. REv. 367 (1968).
172, See, e.g., Toilet Goods Assn. v. Gardner, 360 F.2d 677, 683 (2d Cir. 1966), affd.,
387 U.S. 158 (1967) (specific review provisions applicable to other FDA actions did not
impliedly prevent the pre-enforcement review of color additive regulations). See generally L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 353-75 (1965).
173. See, e.g., Rogers v. Skinner, 201 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1953) (action to determine
whether plaintiff's employees were covered by Fair Labor Standards Act).
174. Compare Rural Electrification Administration v. Central La. Elec. Co., 354
F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1966) (no standing), with Public Serv. Co. v. Hamil, 416 F.2d 648
(7th Cir. 1969) (standing).
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tasks and refusing review; it was understandable that they took the
latter course.175 With the development in the twentieth century of
a sophisticated body of law governing the availability, scope, and
limits of judicial review, this choice is no longer presented. American
experience amply demonstrates that a limited judicial review of governmental actions produces fairer administrative procedures, sounder
substantive results, and better government.176
The essential and sound policy underlying sovereign immunity
-that courts should not engage in indiscriminate interference with
governmental programs-is not abandoned merely because an artificial and outmoded doctrine is abolished. The same basic policy is
inherent in the body of law that governs the availability and scope
of judicial review. Thus, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is unnecessary to prevent courts from entering fields which the Constitution or Congress has delegated to the executive, and from displacing
executive or administrative judgment. In Luftig v. McNamara, 177
for example, a serviceman sought to enjoin the Secretary of Defense
from ordering him to Vietnam, claiming that American military action there was unconstitutional and illegal. In dismissing the action
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit stated:
It is difficult to think of an area less suited for judicial action
than that into which Appellant would have us intrude. The fundamental division of authority and power established by the Constitution precludes judges from overseeing the conduct of foreign
policy or the use and disposition of military power; these matters
are plainly the exclusive province of Congress and the Executive.178
The sovereign immunity doctrine, which was briefly mentioned as an
alternative ground, was superfluous; the result would have been the
same in its absence. Similarly, courts have held that the closing of a
military facility, 179 the shift in location of a customs office,180 and
the discontinuance of a post office, 181 are unreviewable because these
175. Compare Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840), with Harmon v.
Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958). For a discussion of the development of "the presumption
of a right to judicial review," see L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF .ADMINISTRATIVE Acr10N
336-53 (1965).
176. See L. JAFFE, supra note 175, ch. 9.
177. 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 934 (1967).
178. 373 F.2d at 665·66.
179. Armstrong v. United States, 354 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
934 (1966).
180. Los Angeles Customs &: Freight Brokers Assn. v. Johnson, 277 F. Supp. 525
(C.D. Calif. 1967).
181. Sergeant v. Fudge, 238 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937
(1957).
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functions are committed to agency discretion or otherwise inappropriate for judicial determination.
Moreover, the partial abolition of sovereign immunity would
not expose governmental programs to indiscriminate judicial interference by injunction. The result in Dugan v. Rank, 182 for example,
would not have changed if the immunity doctrine had not been
available. The Court in Dugan interpreted the statutes under which
the reclamation project was proceeding as authorizing the seizure of
private water rights and as limiting the plaintiff to his claim for
monetary relief under the Tucker Act.
Some government lawyers, defending the sovereign immunity
doctrine, assert that it prevents a flood of litigation from overwhelming the federal courts and the Government's legal staffs. They
point to the large number of "crackpot" suits which are filed against
the United States and its agencies, and they emphasize the value of
sovereign immunity as a device for getting rid of these cases at the
threshold, without the inconvenience and expense of a defense on
the merits. 183 "Crackpot" suits, however, have deficiencies other than
that they are directed against the United States or its officers. In
nearly every such case there are other grounds for dismissal on the
pleadings (most often because the plaintiff lacks standing, because
the issue is inappropriate for judicial determination, because the
action is committed to agency discretion or precluded from review,
or because the complaint fails to state a claim for relief). Furthermore, in almost all cases government lawyers assert a battery of
defenses and objections of which sovereign immunity is only one.
One suspects that if no other defense or objection exists, the suit is
not properly classified as a "crank" suit and consideration of the
merits is desirable.
The "floodgates" argument is always a difficult one to rebut in
advance, but fears of this kind tend to be exaggerated. The experience of those agencies that are now fully subject to judicial review
under statutory review provisions suggests that the level of litigation
is not crippling or burdensome, and that judicial review has many
advantages, even from the agency's point of view. The heavy expense
of litigation also serves as a pragmatic limit on the volume of suits
182. 372 U.S. 609 (1963), discussed in text accompanying notes 128-32 supra.
183. For an example of a "crackpot" suit, see McShane v. United States, 366 F.2d
286 (9th Cir. 1966), in which the plaintiff sought damages and injunctive relief to
remedy "piracy" and kidnapping which various federal, state, and foreign officials were
alleged to have committed by failing to identify and care for the foreign-born illegitimate children of American servicemen.
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that could be brought. Other limiting doctrines, already discussed,
would allow a threshold disposition of unmeritorious cases.184
In the final analysis, however, if some additional cases do reach
the merits because of the curtailment of sovereign immunity, the
additional burden on government lawyers can be justified on the
same basis as is judicial review in general-the desirability of a
judicial determination of the legality of official action. The ideal
of a government under law can be realized only if persons are provided with an adequate set of judicial remedies against that government, its officials, and its agencies. Remedies against the United
States are impeded by the unsatisfactory case law relating to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. There is need for a limited statutory
reform that will
rid the law of sovereign immunity of the artificialities and rationalizations, particularly those expressed in the Larson case, that have
produced an irreconcilable body of case law and have permittedindeed perhaps encouraged-courts to avoid the difficult task of determining whether, in light of all the relevant considerations, the
purposes of the applicable substantive statute would better be served
by granting or by denying judicial review.185
2. A Reform Proposal
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has been part of AngloAmerican law for centuries. Legislative provision of remedies against
the United States has taken place against a background in which
sovereign immunity was an important feature. The major problem
in drafting a reform statute is to achieve the objective of facilitating
nonstatutory judicial review of federal administrative action without affecting the existing pattern of statutory remedies, without exposing the United States to new liability for money damages, and
without upsetting congressional judgments that a particular remedy
in a given situation should be the exclusive remedy.
These objectives may be accomplished by adding the following
language to section 702 of title 5 of the United States Code:
An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than
money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or
employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or
under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief
therein denied on the ground that it is against the United States or
184. See text accompanying notes 171-82 supra.
185. Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign
Immunity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 HARv. L. REV. 1479, 1525 (1962).

January 1970]

Review of Administrative Action

429

that the United States is an indispensable party. . 186 Nothing
herein (1) affects other limitations on judicial review or the power
or duty of the court to dismiss any action or deny relief on any other
appropriate legal or equitable ground; or (2) confers authority to
grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly
or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.187
A recommendation embodying this language was recently adopted
by the Administrative Conference of the United States188 and will
become the basis for congressional consideration of the problem in
the near future.
a. Application of the proposal. The first sentence of the proposal
eliminates the doctrine of sovereign immunity as a barrier to judicial
review of federal administrative action.189 I£ it is implemented,
claims challenging official action or nonaction, and seeking relief
other than money damages, will not be barred by sovereign immunity. The consent to suit, however, is a limited one. The explicit
exclusion of monetary relief makes it clear that sovereign immunity
is abolished only in actions for specific relief.190 Thus existing
limitations on the recovery of money damages-limitations such as
the exclusion from the Federal Tort Claims Act of most intentional
torts and of activities involving "a discretionary function" 191-are
unaffected.
The consent to suit is also limited to claims in federal courts;
hence the United States would remain immune from suit in state
courts. In addition, the waiver of immunity extends only to actions
challenging the legality of federal action or nonaction and would
not extend to proceedings in which federal officers or agencies are
not acting in their "official capacity or under color of legal authority."192 Thus the long-standing immunity of the United States
186. The deleted sentence, authorizing the plaintiff in such an action to name the
United States as a party defendant, is discussed in the text at 461-63 infra.
187. The proposed revision of § 702 is set forth in the conclusion of this Article,
p. 468 infra.
188. Recommendation 9 of the Administrative Conference of the United States,
adopted Oct. 21, 1969. See 38 U.S.L.W. 2242 (1969).
189. The similar barrier phrased in terms of the United States as an indispensable
party is also removed. For a discussion of the effect on the United States of a judgment
in a suit against an officer, see text accompanying notes 343-48 infra.
190. "Specific relief," as used herein, refers broadly to remedies other than money
damages: injunction, declaratory judgment, mandamus, ejectment, quiet title, and
habeas corpus.
191. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1964).
192. The quoted language is taken from 28 U.S.C. § 139I(e) (1964), which would
govern venue and service of process in actions falling within the purview of the proposal. See text accompanying notes 288-98 infra.
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from garnishment process193 is unaffected. In these cases, in which
an employee of the United States allegedly owes money to a creditor
who attempts by means of state garnishment process to reach wages
due the employee from the United States, the action does not involve a claim that "an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted
or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority." Moreover, the principal action is usually one for monetary
relief.
Special doctrines favoring the United States as a plaintiff1° 4 are
also unaffected by the proposal. The exemption of the United States
from statutes of limitations195 is not based on sovereign immunity but
on the separate ground that the public interest should not suffer
because of the negligence of public officers. Moreover, the proposal
is applicable only to situations in which the action is against the
United States, not to those in which the United States is a plaintiff.
Because the proposal is to be added to section 702 of title 5, a
provision of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) entitled "right
of review," it will be applicable only to functions falling within the
definition of "agency" in the APA. Section 70l(b)(l), formerly section 2(a) of the AP A, defines "agency" very broadly as "each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is
within or subject to review by another agency," except for a list of
exempt agencies or functions: Congress, federal courts, governments
of territories or of the District of Columbia, mediation boards,
courts-martial, and certain other military, wartime, and emergency
functions. 196 Each of these exclusions embodies a congressional desire to limit or foreclose judicial review by placing a function outside
the provisions of the APA. A partial elimination of sovereign immunity should not be used as a vehicle for wholesale revision of these
193. See FHA v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242 (1940).
194. The United States is not liable for costs either as an unsuccessful plaintiff or
as a defendant, unless there is an authorizing statute. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1964). Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are generally applicable to the United
States as a litigant, rule 13(d) provides that the counterclaim provisions do not "enlarge
beyond the limits now fixed by law the right to assert counterclaims against the United
States." A person sued by the United States may counterclaim for damages only as
a defensive set•off or recoupment. See United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940); Bull
v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 261-62 (1935).
195. See United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940).
196. Other statutes that contain provisions exempting a function from the judicial
review sections of the APA include the following: export of scarce materials [50 App.
U.S.C. § 2027 (1964)]; selective service proceedings [50 App. U.S.C. § 463(b) (1964)];
employment and discharge of National Security Agency personnel [50 U.S.C. § 835
(1964)]; renegotiation of defense contracts [50 App. U.S.C. § 1221 (1964)]; certain mine
inspection functions [30 U.S.C. § 483 (1964)]; and certain water resource land acquisition
functions [33 U.S.C. § 597 (1964)].
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congressional desires, which should be respected until they are reconsidered in a more discriminating fashion than is possible in connection with general Iegislation.197
b. Law other than sovereign immunity unchanged. The proposal, after forthrightly abolishing sovereign immunity as a defense
in nonstatutory-review actions, provides that
Nothing herein (I) affects other limitations on judicial review or the
power or duty of the court to dismiss any action or deny relief on
any other appropriate legal or equitable ground ....
This important protective language insures that the abolition of
sovereign immunity will not result in undue judicial interference
with governmental operations or in a flood of burdensome litigation.
Grounds for dismissal or denial of relief under present law include
but are not limited to: (1) The plaintiff's lack of standing; 198 (2) the
absence of a matured controversy; 199 (3) the availability of an alternative remedy in another court; 200 (4) the express or implied preclusion of judicial review; 201 (5) the commission of the matter by
law to the defendant's discretion; 202 (6) the privileged nature of the
defendant's conduct; 203 (7) the plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies; 204 and (8) the discretionary authority of a
court to refuse relief on equitable grounds. 205
197. Professor Byse has suggested a remedial statute that would take the form of
an amendment to chapter 161 of the Judicial Code, which is concerned with the
United States as a party. See Byse, supra note 185, at 1528. See also note 144 supra.
198. See, e.g., Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940); Pennsylvania R.R.
v. Dillon, 335 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
199. See, e.g., International Longshoremen's Union, Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222
(1954).
200. See, e.g., American President Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Board, 235 F.2d
18 (D.C. Cir. 1956). See also statutory and rule provisions denying authority for injunctive relief, such as 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (1964) and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964), prohibiting
injunctive and declaratory relief against the collection of federal taxes.
201. See, e.g., Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666 (1960) (implied preclusion); Barefield
v. Byrd, 320 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1963) (express preclusion).
202. See, e.g., Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309 (1958).
203. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 {1959); United States v. Reynolds, 345
U.S. I (1953).
204. See, e.g., Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
205. In situations for which Congress has not expressly or impliedly precluded
specific relief, injunctive relief will nevertheless be denied if harm to public interests
would result from such relief. By long-standing tradition, an equity court balances
the interests of the parties in deciding what kind of relief is appropriate: "The court,
in its discretion, may refuse ••• to give a remedy which would work public injury or
embarrassment, ••. just as in sound discretion a court of equity may refuse to enforce
or protect legal rights, the exercise of which may be prejudicial to the public interest." United States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dem, 289 U.S. 352, 360 (1933). See also
Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. 481, 490 (1925); APA § IO(d), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 705
(Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
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Incorporation of the reform proposal into the judicial review
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act reinforces the preservation of the existing law of judicial review. As is evident from
prior discussion, abolition of sovereign immunity cannot be considered except in relation to the general law governing the availability and scope of judicial review.206 That law is now codified in
sections 701 to 706 of title 5, formerly section 10 of the APA, and
the incorporation of the abolition of sovereign immunity into section 702 draws on the broader context. The whole matter, for example, is clearly subject to the prefatory language of section 70l(a):
"except to the extent that-(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or
(2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." The
same conclusion would probably be reached in any event, but the
APA context lends clarity to the limited nature of the proposal.
The only valid function served by sovereign immunity-preventing undue judicial interference with governmental programs that
should not be subjected to judicial review-would be performed by
the equitable considerations that control the grant of specific relief
and by the more discriminating and intelligible doctrines governing
the availability of judicial review.207 The most useful of those doctrines is the nonreviewability of action that is expressly or impliedly
precluded from review or committed to agency discretion. Sovereign
immunity and unreviewability are nvo separate ideas, and unreviewability is clearly retained under the proposal. It is fanciful to suppose that abolition of sovereign immunity will allow the courts to
decide issues about foreign affairs, military policy, and other subjects inappropriate for judicial action. 208 Courts are not unaware
of their capabilities and limits; much of the law of unreviewability
consists of marking out areas in which legislative action or traditional
206. See text accompanying notes 171-83 supra.
207. Byse, Proposed Reforms in "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1479, 1530 (1962):
Although I cannot pretend to an encyclopedic knowledge of governmental
regulation or to the prescience needed to foretell judicial reaction to ingenious
efforts of resourceful counsel to extend any statute to its utmost, I am confident
that the various doctrines and principles that govern the availability of judicial
review are sufficiently comprehensive and flexible to prevent an undue increase
in the availability of judicial review and to avoid improper judicial interference
with federal regulatory action.
208. See Gardner v. Toilet Goods Assn., 387 U.S. 167 (1967) (dealing with the reviewability of FDA regulations prior to their enforcement); Panama Canal Co. v. Grace
Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 304 (1958) (holding that the refusal of the Canal Company to
prescribe new rates was not subject to judicial review because the decision to prescribe
rates was "committed to agency discretion by law"). In those cases, the Court, dealing
with matters of the kind that lower courts have held foreclosed by sovereign immunity,
addressed itself to the question of "the appropriateness of the issues for judicial determination." 387 U.S. at 170.
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practice indicates that courts are unqualified or that issues are inappropriate for judicial determination.
Finally, the partial elimination of sovereign immunity will not
allow judges to substitute their judgment for that of administrators.
Established limits on the scope of judicial review will continue to
be operative. Section 706 of title 5209 limits review to questions involving constitutionality, statutory authority, proper procedure,
abuse of discretion, and whether findings are supported by substantial evidence. The scope of review in a case formerly kept out
of court by sovereign immunity will be the same as the scope of
review in a case that has always been reviewable. Substitution of
judgment, de novo consideration, and the like are not permitted.
The proposal does not attempt to state considerations governing
the grant of specific relief. 210 The factors involved are so numerous
and their application so dependent upon the circumstances of individual cases that the attempt to spell them out is an exceedingly
difficult task. It is, moreover, a hazardous one, since any attempt to
restate a complex body of law creates problems while attempting to
solve them. Language suggesting that the law of judicial review is
being changed in one direction or another is almost impossible to
avoid, and any partial restatement of relevant factors creates negative
implications with respect to factors or doctrines that are omitted.
Thus it seems wiser to withdraw the defense of sovereign immunity
in certain situations in which its application is inappropriate, leaving
all other law unrestated and unchanged.
It is true that the proposal vests considerable discretion in the
judiciary, and so the possibility of occasional error remains. But
that possibility is an inevitable concomitant of the administration
of any system by human beings. The risk must be weighed against
the injustices and uncertainties resulting from the sovereign immunity doctrine. 211 If the fear of improper judicial interference does
prove warranted-an unlikely occurrence-the Government is in a
good position to obtain statutory amendments that would have the
effect of correcting abuses.
c. Situations for which Congress has provided an exclusive
209. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) is often referred to by its original numbering as § lO(e) of the APA.
210. In this respect the proposal differs from one tentatively advanced by Professor
Davis. See 3 K. DAVIS, .ADMINISIRATIVE I.Aw TREATISE § 27.10, at 165 (Supp. 1965);
note 144 supra.
211. Error, of course, is possible even under the sovereign immunity doctrine. In
the situation in Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963), lower courts interfered with
the administration of the Central Valley water project for several years until they
were reversed by the Supreme Court.
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remedy. With the exception of the judge-made law governing nonstatutory review, remedies against the United States and its officers
are governed by a large number of statutes, each of which constitutes
a limited consent to suit.212 The harmful consequences of sovereign
immunity as a barrier to nonstatutory review must be eliminated
without effecting an implied repeal of any prohibition, limitation,
or restriction of review contained in those existing statutes. While
this result could probably have been achieved solely by the proposed statute's language preserving all other "legal or equitable
ground[s]" for dismissal, which include the designation by Congress
of an exclusive remedy or method of review, a final proviso to the
statute is intended to prevent any question on this matter from
arising:
Nothing herein ... (2) confers authority to grant relief if any other
statute that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the
relief which is sought.

The policy underlying this proviso does not rest on the notion
that the present statutory pattern of remedies is an ideal one. Indeed,
it is apparent that there are deficiencies in the existing remedial
pattern both in terms of omission213 and coordination.214 Recon212. For a discussion of the statutory development up to 1953, see H. HART &: H.
1140-50 (1953),
213. There are several situations in which neither monetary nor specific relief can
now be obtained and the plaintiff has no judicial remedy at all, even though the matter
is otherwise appropriate for judicial consideration. These cases come about mainly
because of gaps in the Tucker and Tort Claims Acts. There are two situations in
which monetary relief should probably be expanded. The first is that in which tort
damages cannot be recovered under the Federal Tort Claims Act because of its exceptions-especially that excluding most intentional torts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1964).
Reconsideration of the question of when the United States should be liable for the
torts of its officers is long overdue; in the process it may be desirable to clarify inconsistent interpretations of other aspects of the Tort Claims Act. The second situation
for the expansion of monetary relief is that in which such relief cannot be obtained
in the Court of Claims or under the Tucker Act because the claim is quasi-contractual
or restitutionary in character, that is, the claim is based on a contract implied in law
rather than on a contract implied in fact. See, e.g., United States v. Algoma Lumber
Co., 305 U.S. 415, 423 (1939); United States v. Minnesota Mut. Inv. Co., 271 U.S. 212,
217 (1926). Even though the Court of Claims has been adept at circumventing the
limitation by holding that the particular contract is "implied in fact,'' a statutory
amendment providing for restitution damages is desirable. The relation of these matters to sovereign immunity is readily apparent. So long as there are unjustified gaps
in the availability of monetary compensation, there is pressure to grant specific relief,
even in instances in which monetary relief is clearly preferable. Such pressure creates
a substantial risk to the development of an orderly and coherent body of law.
214. The lack of full coordination between the two legislative damage systems
creates pressures which may warp them. The exclusion of contracts "implied in law"
from the Tucker Act tends to push such claims under the Tort Claims Act or to expand the concept of contracts "implied in fact" beyond a reasonable meaning. In
situations in which no monetary relief is available, the claimant may be forced to
bring an injunction suit even though he would prefer money. Other examples come
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
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sideration of the remedial pattern, however, requires detailed consideration of each area involved and such consideration is not feasible
in connection with the limited reforms that are proposed in this
Article. Hence the proposed legislation takes care not to make inadvertent changes in matters that cannot be reconsidered systematically at this time.
The proviso is concerned with situations in which Congress has
consented to suit but in which the remedy provided is intended to
be the exclusive one. The Tucker Act215 provides an apt illustration.
When Congress created a damage remedy for contract claims, with
jurisdiction limited to the Court of Claims except in suits for less
than 10,000 dollars, it intended to foreclose specific performance of
government contracts.216 In the terms of the proviso, a statute granting consent to suit, in this case, the Tucker Act, "impliedly forbids"
relief other than the remedy provided by the Act. Thus the partial
abolition of sovereign immunity brought about by the proposal
does not change existing limitations on specific relief, limitations
which are derived from statutes dealing with such matters as government contracts,217 Indian claims,218 patent infringement,219 tax
claims, 220 and tort claims. Statutes providing an exclusive method of
judicial review of particular administrative action also remain unaffected.221 The language of the proviso directs attention to particular statutes and the decisions interpreting them. If a statute
"grants consent to suit" with respect to a particular subject matter,
specific relief may be obtained only if Congress has not intended
from some of the exceptions to the Tort Claims Act which tend to put expansive
pressure on the concept of a "taking" redressable under the Tucker Act. For Congress
to be in a position to make an intelligent choice among the possibilities of monetary
compensation, specific relief, or both, the statutory exclusions from the Tucker and
Tort Claims Acts should be reviewed for current soundness.
215. 24 Stat. 505, as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a), (b), (d) (1964) (district courts);
28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1964) (Court of Claims).
216. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 131 U.S. 1 (1889) (Tucker Act is limited to
claims for money and does not provide for specific performance).
217. See 28 U.S.C. § 1499 (1964).
218. See 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1964) (jurisdiction of the Court of Claims over certain
types of Indian claims against the United States): 28 U.S.C. § 1353 (1964) (district
court jurisdiction over claims by persons of Indian blood or descent to land allotments
under statute or treaty).
219. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1964) (jurisdiction of Court of Claims over patent in•
fringement claims against the United States).
220. 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (1964) prohibits suits to restrain the assessment or collection
of taxes. See, e.g., Enochs v. Williams Packing &: Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962). 28
U.S.C. § 2201 (1964) exempts controversies "with respect to Federal taxes" from the
authority to grant declaratory judgments.
221. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341·51 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
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the provision for monetary relief to be the exclusive remedy. The
intent of the proposal, however, is to overrule l1falone v. Bowdoin, 222
which held that sovereign immunity barred specific relief for an
alleged unconstitutional taking.223
On the other hand, the language of the proviso should not be
taken as withdrawing existing or alternative remedies. While no
new authority is conferred in situations dealt with by statutes granting consent to suit, nothing is taken away. Presumably there are, at
present, situations in which specific relief can be obtained even
though monetary relief for the claim involved is not authorized by
a statute constituting a consent to suit. An example might be a suit
to enjoin a federal officer from engaging in an intentional tort. In
that situation, a damage remedy against the United States is excluded
by the Tort Claims Act, but the existence of that exclusion does
not affect the availability of specific relief.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is confused, artificial, and
conducive to unjust results. Statutory reform is long overdue. Increasing sentiment in favor of reform is evidenced by the recommendation adopted by the Administrative Conference of the United
States with only one dissenting vote. 224 Congress should now turn
its attention to the matter.
II.

SUBJECT MATIER JURISDICTION

In the main the federal courts possess subject matter jurisdiction
that is adequate to provide a degree of judicial scrutiny of federal
administrative action. There are, however, two puzzling gaps in the
jurisdictional provisions, and both need rectification: (1) the lack of
subject matter jurisdiction of certain cases which challenge federal
administrative action and in which the plaintiff cannot establish that
the value of his claim exceeds 10,000 dollars; and (2) the lack of a
222. 369 U.S. 643 (1962).
223. Both the contract claim, in which specific performance is excluded, and the
claim for an unconstitutional taking arise under provisions of the Tucker Act, Yet
there is a vast difference in theory and policy between the two claims. Congress has
expressed a judgment that specific performance cannot be obtained for a contract
claim for which the Tucker Act provides a monetary remedy. The claim for an unconstitutional taking in the Court of Claims-a last-gap measure to prevent violation of
the fundamental law-is not the same claim as that for specific performance, which is
a private action to prevent interference with property. Congress, by providing a money
remedy for an unconstitutional taking, should not be understood as removing the
pre-existing remedy of injunction to protect property. It is hoped that the proposed
statute will be viewed as overruling Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962), discussed
in text accompanying notes 110-17 supra.
224. Recommendation 9 of the Administrative Conference, adopted Oct. 21, 1969,
See 38 U.S.L.W. 2242 (1969).
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general provision authorizing federal district courts to entertain
quiet-title suits brought against the United States.
A. Elimination of Jurisdictional Amount
in Federal-Question Cases

An anomaly in the law relating to federal court jurisdiction
deprives a United States district court, othenvise competent, from
entertaining certain cases involving nonstatutory review of federal
administrative action in the absence of the jurisdictional amount
required by section 1331 of the Judicial Code, 225 the general "federal question" provision. These cases "arise under" the Federal Constitution or federal statutes, and-subject to the various limiting
rules of standing, exhaustion of remedies, finality, ripeness, and the
like-they are appropriate matters for the exercise of federal judicial power.
Under present law there are a significant number of situations
involving nonstatutory review in which a plaintiff must ground his
action on section 1331 and must be prepared to establish not only
that the action arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States but also that "the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs." In some
of these cases the jurisdictional-amount requirement cannot be met
because it is impossible to place a monetary value on the right asserted by the plaintiff.226 How is one to value an individual's claim
225. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1964):
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 • • • and arises
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
226. It is very difficult to place a monetary value on certain reputational or intangible interests. See Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys., 280 F. Supp. 78 (D. Wyo. 1968),
afjd., 390 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1968), remanded for determination of amount in controversy, 393 U.S. 233, 239 (1968) (freedom from induction resulting from selective
service reclassification); Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 1001 (1965) ("Courts may not treat as a mere technicality the jurisdictional
amount essential to the 'federal question' jurisdiction, even in this case where there
is an allegedly unwarranted invasion of plaintiff's privacy [by continuous FBI surveillance]." 335 F.2d at 368.); Vorachek v. United States, 337 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1964) (disclosure of confidential information about plaintiff by federal officers); Jackson v. Kuhn,
254 F.2d 555 (8th Cir. 1958) (constitutionality of military presence at Little Rock High
School; jurisdictional-amount requirement held not satisfied). With respect to military
status, see Jones, Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts To Review the Character of Military
Administrative Discharges, 57 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 917, 937-41 (1957):
[T)he jurisdictional amount may prove an insurmountable obstacle since the plaintiff-veteran [in military discharge situations] probably would not be able to establish that the requisite $3,000 is involved in the controversy over the character of
his discharge, a matter as to which be has the burden of proof.
See also Meador, Judicial Determinations of Military Status, 72 YALE L.J. 1293, 1298
n.27 (1963).
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that he is entitled to remain free from military service, to travel
abroad, or to be free from continuous police surveillance? In other
cases the plaintiff's claim that he is entitled to a federal grant or
benefit, such as federal employment or the use of public lands, may
be assigned a monetary value, but the amount in controversy may
be 10,000 dollars or less. 227 Although judicial review of these and
similar claims may be unavailable or limited in scope for other
reasons, judicial consideration of the plaintiff's claim should not be
foreclosed solely because of a lack of the jurisdictional amount.
The problem is illustrated by the recent case of Boyd v. Clark,2 28
in which four Selective Service registrants challenged the constitutionality of college-student deferments provided by the Military
Selective Service Act of 1967,229 on the ground that student deferments arbitrarily discriminate against persons who are economically
unable to attend college. The three-judge district court, in an opinion by Judge Hays, granted the Government's motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdictional amount:
Plaintiffs' counsel concedes that he cannot prove that any of the
plaintiffs will suffer a monetary loss of more than $10,000 by reason
of the injury alleged [increased likelihood of induction].
It is firmly settled law that cases involving rights not capable of
valuation in money may not be heard in federal courts where the
227. Employment interests: E.g., Neustein v. Mitchell, 130 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1942)
(loss of a state office because of federal enforcement of the Hatch Act prohibitions on
political activity); Carroll v. Somervell, ll6 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1941) (the value of federal
employment measured by lost wages); Fischler v. McCarthy, II7 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y),
affd. on other grounds, 218 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1954) (the bare allegation that the
value of federal employment exceeded $3,000 was not accepted); cf. Friedman v. International Assn. of Machinists, 220 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (the value of a member's
expulsion from a union is to be measured by loss of wages). One line of cases that
formerly was troubled by the jurisdictional-amount requirement involved the preferential employment rights of veterans. See Christner v. Poudre Valley Cooperative Assn.,
134 F. Supp. ll5 (D. Colo. 1955), afjd., 235 F.2d 946 (10th Cir. 1956). This particular
problem has now been cured by a statute which specifically provides for federal
jurisdiction in such cases without regard to jurisdictional amount.
Freedom from regulatory interference: E.g., Quinault Tribe of Indians v. Gallagher,
368 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1966) (freedom of an Indian reservation from state civil and
criminal authority); Gavica v. Donaugh, 93 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1937) (enforcement of
regulations governing grazing on public lands); Dewar v. Brooks, 16 F. Supp. 636 (D.
Nev. 1936) (same); Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890 (D. Wyo. 1945) (creation of a
national monument); cf. Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, S.A. v. McLeod, 300 F.2d 222
(2d Cir. 1962) (employer's suit to enjoin the regional director of the National Labor
Relations Board from conducting a representation election).
Property rights: E.g., Cameron v. United States, 146 U.S. 533 (1892) ("It is not, however, the value of the property in dispute in this case which is involved, but the value
of the color of title to this property, which is hardly capable of pecuniary estimation,
and if it were, there is no evidence of such value in this case." 146 U.S. at 535.); Helvy
v. Webb, 36 F. Supp. 243 (S.D. Cal. 1941) (value of grazing lands).
228. 287 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.J. 1968).
229. 50 U.S.C. § 456(h)(l) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
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applicable jurisdictional statute requires that the matter in controversy exceed a certain number of dollars. . . . The "right to the
custody, care, and society" of a child, the court noted [in Barry v.
Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103 (1847)], "is evidently utterly incapable
of being reduced to any pecuniary standard of value, as it rises
superior to money considerations." 46 U.S. at 120. Since the statute
permitted appeals only in those cases where the "matter in dispute
exceeds the sum or value of two thousand dollars," the court concluded that it was without jurisdiction:
"The words of the act of Congress are plain and unambiguous .... There are no words in the law, which by any just
interpretation can be held to ... authorize us to take cognizance of cases to which no test of money value can be applied."230
Judge Edelstein dissented, arguing that the plaintiffs' allegation
that the matter in controversy exceeded 10,000 dollars should not
be scrutinized, at least when the defendant did not move to dismiss
on that ground, or, alternatively, that the court should "assume that
freedom from an unconstitutional discrimination exceeds the sum
or value of $10,000.00."231 He suggested that the jurisdictionalamount requirement was an unconstitutional one in situations, such
as this, in which the action, because it is against federal officers,
could not be brought in a state court.232
The reasons for objecting to the absence of federal jurisdiction
in a case like Boyd v. Clark are readily apparent. The factors relevant to the question of whether or not a federal court should be
available to a litigant seeking protection of a federal right have little,
if any, correlation with the minimum jurisdictional amount. Instead they involve such considerations as whether there is a need
for a specialized federal tribunal and whether there are defects in
the state judicial system that might substantially impair consideration of the plaintiff's claim. These factors have special force in cases
in which specific relief is sought against a federal officer, because
state courts generally are powerless to restrain or direct a federal
officer's action which is taken under color of federal law. 233 In this
respect, a suit against a federal officer differs from other federal230. 287 F. Supp. at 564. In support of its holding, the court cited Kurtz v. Moffitt,
ll5 U.S. 487, 498 (1885); First Natl. Bank of Youngstown v. Hughes, 106 U.S. 523
(1882): Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1964): Carroll v. Somervell, 116
F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1941): United States ex rel. Curtiss v. Haviland, 297 F. 431 (2d Cir.
1924): and 1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1J 0.92[5] (2d ed. 1964).
231. 287 F. Supp. at 568.
232. 287 F. Supp. at 568.
233. See Arnold, The Power of State Courts To Enjoin Federal Officers, 73 YALE
L.J. 1385 (1964).
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question cases subject to the jurisdictional-amount requirement,
such as those attacking state statutes on federal constitutional
grounds. In those cases an alternative state forum is available to the
plaintiff; but in the situation in question here, the denial of a federal forum for lack of the jurisdictional amount may be a denial of
any remedy whatsoever. As Judge Edelstein pointed out in his dissent in Boyd v. Clark, jurisdictional provisions which deny a litigant
any opportunity to present federal constitutional claims may themselves present constitutional difficulties. 234
The lack of a state forum in actions against federal officers serves
to distinguish this recommendation from other and more general
proposals to eliminate the jurisdictional-amount requirement in
federal-question cases. The American Law Institute, for example,
has recommended that the jurisdictional-amount requirement be
abandoned in federal-question cases. 235 Whether or not that broader
proposal is accepted, the narrower problem with which this recommendation is concerned needs correction.
It is unclear why Congress, when, in 1958, it increased the jurisdictional amount in diversity-of-citizenship cases from 3,000 dollars
to 10,000 dollars, also raised the minimum jurisdictional amount in
federal-question cases arising under section 1331. The legislative
history merely asserts that the effect of the change is insignificant
because the only cases affected are those involving the constitutionality of state statutes and those arising under the Jones Act.236
Virtually all other cases were said to fall within one of the special
federal-question statutes which require no minimum jurisdictional
amount. 237 If this were the case, however, it is difficult to see why the
provision was enacted, since the only purpose of increasing the jurisdictional amount was to reduce the workload of the federal courts,
a purpose which would not be advanced if federal-question cases
were unaffected. 238 Moreover, the assertion that the significant cases
234. 287 F. Supp. at 568.
235. ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS § 1311 and commentary at 172-76 (1969).
236. See, e.g., 104 CONG. R.Ec. 12,688-89 CTune 30, 1958); S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1958). Since cases brought under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964), are
actions by seamen or their personal representatives to recover damages for personal
injury or wrongful death, the jurisdictional-amount requirement is not a barrier as a
practical matter. In such actions the plaintiff can always allege "pain and suffering"
in excess of the jurisdictional amount.
237. 104 CONG, R.Ec. 12,689 (June 30, 1958); S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
6 (1958).
238. For an excellent discussion, see Friedenthal, New Limitations on Federal
Jurisdiction, 11 STAN. L. R.Ev. 213, 216-18 (1959).
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which arise under section 1331 are limited to the two categories
mentioned is misleading and erroneous. There is an important third
category-the one with which this recommendation is concernedin which persons aggrieved by federal administrative action are
seeking nonstatutory review in an action brought against the officer.
In these cases the plaintiff must follow one of the following courses:
(I) he can satisfy the minimum jurisdictional amount required by
section 1331; (2) he can bring his action in the District of Columbia;
(3) he can cast his action in the form of a mandamus proceeding,
thus qualifying under the provisions of the Mandamus and Venue
Act of 1962; 239 or (4) he can attempt to persuade the court that section IO of the Administrative Procedure Act240 provides an independent jurisdictional basis for judicial review of federal administrative
action, a proposition that is much in doubt. Brief consideration will
be given to the unsatisfactory nature of each of these alternatives.
With respect to the first, the principles for determining whether
the amount in controversy satisfies statutory requirements are well
established. The plaintiff has the burden of alleging and proving
jurisdictional facts. The plaintiff's ad damnum is ordinarily taken
at face value unless it appears not to have been made in good faith,
or unless the court believes that as a matter of legal certainty the
value of the right in controversy is less than the minimum
amount. 241 There is no guarantee, however, that the court will not
examine in detail the value of the plaintiff's claim. In Carroll v.
Somervell,242 for example, in which a federal employee sought to
enjoin his dismissal for failure to sign a non-Communist affidavit,
the employee alleged that his loss of standing in the community was
worth more than 3,000 dollars. Nevertheless, the case was dismissed
for lack of jurisdictional amount on the ground that the value of
the claim was measured by the maximum compensation-less than
3,000 dollars-that the employee would be entitled to receive during the ensuing year.
As the Carroll case indicates, the methods of valuation in injunction suits are conservative. In McNutt v. General 1.vf.otors Acceptance
Corporation, 243 it was held that in an attack on a regulatory statute
the amount in controversy is not the value of the business or other
239. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 139l(e) (1964).
240. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
241. See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89
(1938); Note, Determination of Federal Jurisdictional Amount in Suits on Unliquidated
Claims, 64 MrCH. L. R.Ev. 930 (1966).
242. 116 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1941).
243. 298 U.S. 178 (1936).
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activity regulated, but the difference between its value regulated and
unregulated. 244 Although some cases ignore these principles by treating the plaintiff's ad damnum as conclusive,245 a plaintiff seeking
judicial review of federal administrative action cannot rely on the
possibility that this approach will be taken. The frequency with
which the problem arises has already been indicated. 246
As a second alternative, the plaintiff might elect to litigate in
the District of Columbia. The district court for the District of Columbia has long been viewed as inheriting the inherent and common-law powers of the Maryland courts.247 Prior to 1962, this
inheritance meant that the courts in the District of Columbia were
the only federal courts that possessed the power to issue original
writs of mandamus as a general matter. 248 The mandamus problem
was cured by the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, which conferred power on district courts everywhere to entertain "any action
in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the
United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the
plaintiff."249 In addition to its mandamus power, however, the district court for the District of Columbia also "has a general equity
jurisdiction,"250 which it may exercise without regard to the amount
in controversy. 251
The resulting situation is hardly a logical or defensible one.
Congress, in 1962, disturbed by the inability of litigants to obtain
mandamus relief in local courts distributed around the country,
conferred such jurisdiction on all district courts without regard to
the amount in controversy. The more traditional exercise of injunctive or declaratory authority, however, remains subject to the requirement of a minimum jurisdictional amount whenever no special
federal-question statute is available-except in the District of
Columbia. The same arguments that supported the Mandamus and
244. See also Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263 (1934) (the amount in controversy in tax
litigation is measured by the amount of the tax rather than of the penalty).
245. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (federal taxpayer's attack on federal
grants to religious schools); Townsend v. Zimmerman, 237 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956)
(attack on selective service classification).
246. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 226·27 supra.
247. See Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review:
Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 HARv. L. REV. 1479, 1499502 (1962).
248. See, e.g., Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838);
Marshall v. Crotty, 185 F.2d 622, 627 (1st Cir. 1950).
249. 28 u.s.c. § 1361 (1964).
250. Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 290 (1944).
251. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-521, 11-961, 11-962 (Supp. n, 1969).
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Venue Act of 1962-the expense and inconvenience of forcing litigants from all over the country to bring their claims to a District of
Columbia court-support the elimination of the remaining anachronism in injunction suits against federal officers.
The third alternative available to a plaintiff is to cast his suit
against the officer in the form of a mandamus action and to bring
it in a local district court. As has already been indicated, the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, was intended to provide litigants
with a convenient local forum in actions to require a federal officer
to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff. No jurisdictional amount is
required in actions coming within section 1361. However, in situations in which the federal officer does not "owe a duty" to the plaintiff, but has unlawfully interfered with the plaintiff's rights-the
traditional situation giving rise to injunctive relief-section 1361
cannot provide the basis for federal jurisdiction. Moreover, since
an action under section 1361 is "in the nature of mandamus," there
is a risk that the court will hold that a negative decree cannot be
issued or that the ministerial-discretionary distinction and other
technicalities of mandamus law will significantly narrow the scope
of review. These problems have been ably discussed by Professor
Byse and a co-author, who have concluded that the present availability of the mandamus remedy does not dispose of all of the troublesome limitations on the availability of nonstatutory review. 252
As a final possible course of action, a plaintiff might rely on
section IO of the AP A as an independent source of federal jurisdietion. Section IO of the APA provides that, subject to some qualifications, "a person suffering legal ·wrong because of agency action . . •
is entitled to judicial review thereof" and that "final agency action
for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court is subject
to judicial review." 253 It also provides that "[t]he form of proceeding for judicial review" may be brought "in a court of competent
jurisdiction."254 Although the section does not expressly confer jurisdiction on federal courts and has been generally viewed as restating
the existing law of judicial review, it is arguable-though unlikely
-that section IO was intended to be an independent grant of federal jurisdiction to review "final agency action." If that argument
were accepted, such a holding would go far to ameliorate the prob252. Byse 8e Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and
"Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARV. L. REv.
308 (1967).
253. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
254. 5 U.S.C. § 703 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
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lem created by the jurisdictional-amount requirement. Cases seeking
judicial review of federal administrative action could be entertained
by federal courts without regard to jurisdictional amount, except
in those situations exempt from the APA or included within the
qualifying phrase of section IO: "except to the extent that ... statutes preclude judicial review ... [or] agency action is committed
to agency discretion by Iaw." 255 Thus, the crucial question is whether
section 10 is in fact an independent ground of federal jurisdiction.
Four courts have recently concluded that it is. 256 It is doubtful,
however, that in any of those cases the jurisdiction of the district
court had to be rested on section 10: special federal-question provisions existed in two of the cases,257 and it is probable that the minimum jurisdictional amount under section 1331 could have been
satisfied in the others.258 Moreover, none of the cases contains an
extensive or reasoned discussion of the question whether section 10
is an independent ground of subject matter jurisdiction in federal
courts. A number of other cases-at least five-have reached the
conclusion that the APA is not a source of jurisdiction.259 But these
decisions are no more satisfactory in reasoning than those going the
other way. 260 Despite the conflict of circuits, however, the Supreme
255. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
256. Brennan v. Udall, 379 F.2d 803 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 975 (1967)
(determination by the Department of the Interior which adversely affected a land•
owner's title); Coleman v. United States, 363 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1966), afjd. on rehear•
ing, 379 F.2d 555 (1967), revd. on other grounds, 390 U.S. 599 (1968) (determination
by the same department concerning the validity of a mining claim); Cappadora v.
Celebrezze, 356 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1966) (alternative holding) (the refusal of the Social
Security Adiminstration to reopen a claim for survivors' benefits); Estrada v. Ahrens,
296 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1961) (Immigration and Naturalization Sen•ice action excluding
an alien from entry).
257. Cappadora and Estrada.
258. Brennan and Coleman.
259. Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d
529 (8th Cir. 1967) (attack on the manner of holding tribal election); Chournos v.
United States, 335 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1964) (determination of the Department of the
Interior concerning the validity of placer mining claim); Local 542, Operating Engrs.
v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1964) (NLRB refusal to hold a representation election); Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 278 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1960) (termination
of a government contract); Kansas City Power 8: Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955) (federally supported power program).
260. In Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370
F.2d 529, 532 (8th Cir. 1967), the court merely stated a conclusion that § IO "does not
confer jurisdiction upon federal courts. Its purpose is to define the procedures and
manner of judicial review of agency action rather than confer jurisdiction." Chournos
v. United States, 335 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1964), really involved the separate problem
of whether § IO waives sovereign immunity, while Kansas City Power 8: Light Co. v.
McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1955), involved standing rather than subject matter
jurisdiction. The remaining two cases appear to have been correctly decided on other
grounds: In Local 542, Operating Engrs. v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1964), the
court held that nonstatutory review of NLRB matters under the doctrine of Leedom
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Court has not yet spoken on the question, although in Rusk v.
Cort, 261 the Court appears to have assumed that section 10 is a jurisdictional grant. Accordingly, the question remains an open one,
clouded by uncertainty.
Thus, since none of the possible courses of action available to
a plaintiff in seeking nonstatutory review is satisfactory or free
from doubt, the jurisdictional-amount requirement remains a problem in suits against federal officers for injunctive or declaratory relief. The jurisdictional-amount requirement in such cases serves no
useful purpose and should be eliminated. Because it is at best doubtful that this objective can be reached by interpretation of the AP A,
enactment of new legislation to handle the problem is desirable.
Remedial legislation might take either of two forms: first, an abandonment of the jurisdictional-amount requirement in all federalquestion cases; 262 or second, the addition of a new special federalquestion provision to the Judicial Code. A recent recommendation
of the Administrative Conference of the United States follows the
second approach in urging that federal district courts be given subject matter jurisdiction "without regard to the amount in controversy, of any action in which the plaintiff alleges that he has been
injured or threatened with injury by an officer or employee of the
United States or any agency thereof, acting under color of federal
law:•2oa
Of these t1\To alternatives, the former should be given a slight
preference. Elimination of the jurisdictional-amount requirement
in all federal-question cases is a simpler and easier remedy than is
the attempt to create a new special federal-question provision for
judicial-review actions. The limiting language that is included in
any provision of the latter type could prove troublesome in some
applications; and there is a slight danger that the provision of a new
jurisdictional basis for judicial-review actions would be viewed as
affecting special statutory review provisions. Moreover, elimination
v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958), takes place in district courts rather than in a court of
appeals as had been urged; and in Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 278 F.2d
912 (2d Cir. 1960), the court held that district court jurisdiction of claims arising out
of government contracts is precluded because of the existence of an adequate statutory
remedy.
261. 369 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1962) (passport issuance).
262. This approach would have the virtue of achieving the broader purposes urged
by the ALI Study. See ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS § 1311 and commentary at 172-76 (1969). See the proposed revision
of § 1311 in the conclusion of this Article, p. 469 infra.
263. Reco=endation 7 of the Administrative Conference of the United States,
adopted Dec. 11, 1968.
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of the jurisdictional-amount requirement in all federal-question
cases is desirable for its own sake.264 The jurisdiction of federal district courts would be extended to only one significant category of
cases in addition to that involving judicial review of federal administrative action. Such cases are those in which a state statute is challenged on federal constitutional grounds, 265 and they too should not
be barred from federal courts merely because the plaintiff is unable
to establish the requisite jurisdictional amount.
B. Property Disputes Between the United States and

Private Persons
Federal law does not contain any general provision authorizing
quiet-title suits involving land claimed by the United States. In the
absence of such a provision, attempts to obtain specific relief against
a federal officer in possession of disputed land have foundered on
the sovereign immunity doctrine. Malone v. Bowdoin,266 in which
it was held that sovereign immunity barred a suit to try title, denies
specific relief to the private landowner, leaving him a damage remedy under the Tucker Act267 for an unconstitutional "taking."
The invocation of the sovereign immunity defense in land disputes like Malone works an unnecessary injustice on private persons
holding bona fide claims against the United States. Specific relief is
a highly appropriate remedy in these situations. Land has traditionally been viewed as a unique form of property, and this uniqueness favors the application of equitable remedies when there is a
dispute over possession. Yet, as illustrated in Malone, the sovereign
immunity defense operates to foreclose the possibility of specific
relief, and relegates the private plaintiff to a damage remedy under
the Tucker Act, a remedy which is inadequate under traditional
principles of equity. Moreover, the damage remedy may be unsatisfactory in other respects. If the value of the disputed property exceeds 10,000 dollars, the plaintiff must bring his action in the Court
of Claims, which has exclusive jurisdiction over claims exceeding
that amount. 268 The Court of Claims is a distant and unfamiliar
tribunal, more expensive and time-consuming than is a local federal
district court.
264. See the discussion in the ALI Study, supra note 262.
265. For the argument that the jurisdictional-amount requirement is not a practical impediment to cases brought under the Jones Act, see note 236 supra.
266. 369 U.S. 643 (1962), discussed in text accompanying note llO supra.
267. 24 Stat. 505 (1887), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a), (b), (d) (1964) (district
courts); 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1964) (Court of Claims).
268. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1964).
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In land dispute cases, then, specific relief should be available in
federal district courts. If the sovereign immunity defense were abolished, and if subject matter jurisdiction over land disputes existed,
a nonstatutory suit for specific relief could be brought in the district
court of the state in which the land is located.269 The availability of
such an action would provide the landowner with an easily accessible and inexpensive local forum. Moreover, the local federal district
court would be ideally suited for determining the issues which arise
in these cases, since those issues usually involve a blend of state land
law and federal statutory law.
The availability of specific relief in federal courts would also
have a salutary substantive effect. Cases now dismissed on technicalities would be decided on the merits, thereby subjecting governmental practices to more scrutiny than they now receive. Hopefully,
the Government would be forced to adhere to prescribed processes
for exercising the power of eminent domain. Simons v. Vinson 210
presents an example of a case in which sovereign immunity allowed
the Government to seize land without following eminent domain
procedures. In that case, sovereign immunity was held to bar a claim
to accreted land formed along a river which divided land owned
by the United States from that of the plaintiffs. The Government
could not have legitimately exercised its power of eminent domain
since no public purpose could have been shown-apparently the
Government's only purpose in "taking" the disputed land was to
collect royalties from oil produced on it. Thus, the sovereign immunity defense prevented any scrutiny of the Government's activities and deprived the plaintiffs of an opportunity to prove the lack
of public purpose. In other cases, such as Malone or Gardner v.
Harris, 271 in which the disputed land was part of a larger parcel
devoted to a public purpose, eminent domain was probably available, but the "taking" was not in accordance with prescribed procedures. Once again, however, sovereign immunity resulted in dismissal without a consideration of the merits. It would not seem too
much to ask that condemnation of private land be accomplished in
accordance with the policies and procedures established by Congress, rather than being carried out by the unilateral decision of a
government officer, perhaps a subordinate one, in claiming the land
or taking possession of it.
§

269. In such a suit, service of process and venue would be governed by 28 U.S.C.
139l(e) (1964). See text accompanying notes 292-96 infra.
270. 394 F.2d 732 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 968 (1968).
271. 391 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1968).
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The partial abolition of sovereign immunity, urged in part I of
this Article, would help to ensure that proper procedures are followed. It would, moreover, do much to open the door to suits for
injunctive or declaratory relief in land dispute cases in which the
plaintiff frames his complaint so as to meet federal-question requirements. But if the abolition of sovereign immunity is not supplemented by a corresponding expansion of subject matter jurisdiction,
private persons would still be unable to sue the government in the
form of a quiet-title action. The availability of specific relief, then,
would depend either upon the plaintiff's ability to cast his complaint
in the form of a suit to enjoin an unconstitutional taking272 or else
upon his satisfaction of the diversity-of-citizenship requirement in
section 1332.273 There should be no such premium on a plaintiff's
ability to adapt the substantive claim to fit technical procedural
forms.
The importance of the problem suggests a broad proposal vesting in United States district courts subject matter jurisdiction of
"any civil action to quiet title, or to remove a cloud on title, to real
property where a matter in controversy arises out of a claim by the
United States of an interest in the real property other than one
arising from unpaid federal taxes." 274 The need for a statutory provision authorizing federal, and perhaps state, courts to resolve land
disputes is widely accepted. A report prepared for the Public Land
Law Review Commission, for example, stated that "[t]here seems
to be somewhat general agreement that there should be statutory
provision for suits to try title." 275 There is gamesmanship involved in the only present method of circumventing sovereign immunity-getting federal officials to take the initiative in bringing
court suits. Sometimes government lawyers are unwilling to take
this step merely because they do not want to shoulder the plaintiff's
burdens. The ability of the private claimant to initiate suit would
remedy that problem.
272. See White v. Sparkhill Realty Corp., 280 U.S. 500 (1930), stating that a suit to
enjoin unconstitutional conduct comes within the federal-question jurisdiction but
that an ejectment complaint, "without anticipating possible defenses, would not present a case arising under the Constitution or a treaty or law of the United States."
In Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962), an ejectment action against a federal officer
originally brought in a state court, federal jurisdiction rested upon the removal statutes; but it is doubtful that the case could have been brought originally in a federal
district court in the absence of diversity of citizenship and jurisdictional amount, since
the plaintiff's claim rested on state law.
273. 28 u.s.c. § 1332 (1964).
274. The quoted language is from a tentative draft of a proposed quiet-title statute,
which would be added to the Judicial Code as 28 U.S.C. § 1347A.
275. C. McFARLAND, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES AND THE PUBLIC LANDS-A REPORT
PREPARED FOR THE PUBLIC LAND LAw REvmw COMMISSION 305 (1969).
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Remedial legislation on this subject has been drafted by the Department of Justice, but thus far has not received priority on the
Department's legislative program.276 A number of substantial issues
need to be explored before effective legislation can be enacted.
Should the legislation permit the extinguishment of ancient conditions and reservations contained in the original disposition of the
public domain? 277 Should concurrent jurisdiction be given to state
courts?278 What precautions should be taken to ensure that such
legislation would not reopen vexing questions involving water
rights, Indian claims, and the like? Moreover, some procedural aspects of land dispute litigation involving the United States deserve
special treatment; such aspects include questions of interlocutory
relief, jury trial, multiple parties, and relation to eminent domain.
All of these questions are beyond the scope of this Article, and
therefore no specific proposal will be made here. It is to be hoped,
however, that a careful study of these and other questions by the
Public Land Law Review Commission or others will result in the
early enactment of sound legislation.

Ill. p ARTffiS

DEFENDANT

The size and complexity of the federal government, coupled
with the intricate and technical law concerning official capacity and
parties defendant have given rise to innumerable cases in which a
plaintiff's claim has been dismissed because the wrong defendant
was named or served. The Gnotta case,279 discussed at the outset of
276. Letter to the author from Shiro Kashiwa, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, July 15, 1969.
277. In the disposal of public domain land, the United States bas quite commonly
imposed conditions and reserved a variety of rights such as easements. Many of these
residual interests have been in existence for seventy-five years or more. Many have
never been exercised and are obsolete today. Yet they remain as troublesome exceptions
to any title examiner's report. Since the title of most of the land in thirty-one states
has come from the United States, and since state quiet-title laws are powerless to
deal with these matters, there is a great need for federal quiet-title legislation that will
provide the basis for the extinguishment of such residual interests after some extended
period of time, perhaps forty years, unless the United States asserts such an interest
in a properly founded quiet-title proceeding.
278. Because the United States has been the origin of title for a very large portion
of the real property of the nation, a substantial volume of litigation might be generated by federal quiet-title legislation. Much of this litigation could be adequately
handled by state courts under appropriate enabling legislation. There is no compelling reason for federal courts to have exclusive jurisdiction of situations in which
the United States has been out of possession for more than forty years. On the other
hand, it may be desirable to vest exclusive jurisdiction in federal courts in cases in
which the United States now has possession of the real property or claims the right
to possession at the time a quiet-title proceeding is initiated.
279. Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969), discussed in text accompanying notes 4-10 supra.
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this Article, is illustrative. The plaintiff in that case attempted to
obviate the problem by naming as defendants the United States, the
Department of the Army, the Civil Service Commission, and seven
individual officers of the Army Corps of Engineers. The United
States could not be sued without its consent; the Department of
the Army as "a part of the executive branch" of the Government
could also cloak itself in the mantle of the sovereign; 280 and poor
Gnotta, in suing "the United States Civil Service Commission"
failed to understand that the Supreme Court had required that actions attacking determinations of the Commission must be brought
not against the Commission but against its individual members. 281
The tangled web of problems involving parties defendant in
judicial-review actions has been ameliorated over the years, but
substantial room for improvement remains. The ultimate goal has
been clearly stated by the Supreme Court: modem procedure
"reject[s] the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which
one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept[s]
the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper
decision on the merits." 282 What is true of ordinary civil litigation
is even more true when a citizen is attempting to obtain redress
from his government. The ends of justice are not served when government attorneys advance highly technical rules in order to prevent
a determination on the merits of what may be just claims.283
The numerous problems relating to parties defendant can be
cured by (I) recognition and acceptance by the Department of Justice that Congress and the draftsmen of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure have provided a solution for most of the problems that
arise when the plaintiff sues the wrong defendant or fails to join a
superior officer; 284 (2) amending section 703 of title 5 to allow the
plaintiff to name as defendant in judicial review proceedings the
United States, the agency by its official title, the appropriate officer,
or any combination of them; 285 and (3) adopting several minor
280. 415 F.2d at 1277.
281. 415 F.2d at 1277. See Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512, 514-16 (1952); Bell v.
Groak, 371 F.2d 202, 204 (7th Cir. 1966).
282. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957).
283. Professor Davis asks whether the Government should "spend taxpayers' money
to pay government lawyers to use their ingenuity in developing technical complexities that will prevent plaintiffs from getting their cases decided on the merits •••."
Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending To Sue an Officer, 29 U. Cm. L.
REv. 435, 439 (1962).
284. See text accompanying notes 288-322 infra.
285. See text accompanying notes 326-31 infra, and the proposed revision of 5
U.S.C. § 703 in the conclusion of this Article, p. 469 infra.
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changes in the language of section 1391(e) of title 28-the venue
provision of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962.286

A. Attempts To Deal with the Problems
The unsatisfactory state of the law of parties defendant has been
recognized for some time287 and three attempts have now been made
to cure the deficiencies. First, Congress, in 1962, amended section
139l(e) of title 28 in order to allow broadened venue and extraterritorial service in suits against federal officers and thus to circumvent
the formally troublesome requirement that superior officers be
joined as parties defendant. Second, rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure was amended in 1961 to provide for the automatic substitution of successors in office. That rule also states that
"any misnomer not affecting the substantial rights of the parties
shall be disregarded" and that the officer may be "described as a
party by his official title rather than by name." Third, rule 15(c)
of the Federal Rules was amended in 1966 to deal with a plaintiff's
failure to name any appropriate officer or agency as defendant. Each
of these three remedial provisions will now be discussed in detail.

I. Section 139l(e): Service of Process, Venue, and
Indispensable Parties
Apart from section 139l(e) the service of process in nonstatutory
review actions is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 4(d)(4) covers the service of process upon the United States.
It provides that process must be served by delivery of a copy of the
summons and complaint to the United States Attorney for the dis286. See text accompanying notes 332•37 infra, and the proposed revision of 28
U.S.C. § 139l(e) in the conclusion of this Article, p. 469 infra. A minor anomaly in
the coverage of § 139l(e) may also deserve legislative correction. Because various ter•
ritories of the United States are not "judicial districts" within the meaning of 28
U.S.C. § 451 (1964), the extraterritorial service of process and broadened venue of
§ 139l(e) are not available. See Doyle v. Fleming, 219 F. Supp. 277 (D.C.Z. 1963)
(quashing service of process under § 139I(e) because Canal Zone is not a "judicial district'1: Canal Zone Cent. Labor Union v. Fleming, 246 F. Supp. 998 (D.C.Z. 1965),
revd. on other grounds sub nom. Leber v. Canal Zone Cent. Labor Union, 383 F.2d
ll0, 113 n.3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1046 (1967) (same). Requiring the Sec•
retary of the Army to defend an action in the Canal Zone or Guam places no greater
burden on government attorneys than does sending them to defend an action in
Hawaii. The omission of territorial courts should be corrected unless considerations
with respect to the nature or powers of those courts provide a rational basis for the
omission.
287. See the full discussion in Byse, Suing the "Wrong" Defendant in Judicial Re•
view of Federal Administrative Action: Proposal for Reform, 77 HARV. L. R.Ev. 40
(1963); Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending To Sue an Officer, 29 U.
Cm. L. R.Ev. 435 (1962).
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trict in which the action is brought. In addition, a copy of the summons and complaint must be sent by registered or certified mail to
the Attorney General of the United States in Washington, D.C.
Failure to notify the Attorney General has been held to require dismissal,288 although a few decisions prior to the 1966 amendment of
rule 15(c)289 permit the defect to be cured when dismissal would
mean the barring of plaintiff's claim because of the running of the
statute of limitations.290 Moreover, in an action against the United
States attacking the validity of an order of a federal officer or agency,
if the officer or agency has not been made a party to the action, a
copy of the summons and complaint must also be sent by registered
or certified mail to the relevant federal officer or agency.
Rule 4(d)(5), which supersedes prior inconsistent statutes, must
be followed to effect service of process on an officer or agency of the
United States. A copy of the summons and complaint must be delivered to the officer or agency being sued and service must be made
on the United States itself as provided for in rule 4(d)(4). If the
federal agency involved is a corporation, rule 4(d)(5) requires that
service also be made on the agent of the corporation as provided in
rule 4(d)(3), in addition to service upon the United States under
rule 4(d)(4).291
Section 139l(e), which was added to the Judicial Code in 1962,292
dispenses with the requirement of personal service in actions in
which each defendant is an officer or employee of the United States
or any agency thereof, acting in his official capacity or under color
of legal authority. Nationwide service of process in such actions has
circumvented difficulties stemming from holdings that superior officers are indispensable parties, and has allowed the citizen to sue
his Government in a local federal district court. The provision reflects a congressional decision that "[r]equiring the Government to
defend Government officials and agencies in places other than Washington" is fairer to citizens and is not "a burdensome imposition"
on the Government. 293 In cases of this type, delivery of the summons
288. Smith v. McNamara, 395 F.2d 896 (10th Cir. 1968): Messenger v. United States,
231 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1956): Lemmon v. Social Security Administration, 20 F.R.D. 215
(E.D.S.C. 1957).
289. The "relation back" amendment of rule 15(c) is discussed in the text accompanying notes 315-21 infra.
290. Rollins v. United States, 286 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1961); Fugle v. United States,
157 F. Supp. 81 (D. Mont. 1957).
291. For an excellent discussion of rule 4(d)(5), see 4 C. WRIGHT &: A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§§ 1107-08 (1969).
292. Section 139l(e) is the venue part of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962,
28 U.S.C. § 139l(e) (1964).
293. H.R. REP. No. 536, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
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and complaint may be by certified mail rather than personal delivery
if the officer or agency to be served is beyond the territorial limits
of the district in which the action is brought. Other aspects of rule
4, however, continue to be applicable. Thus in any such case service
must be made upon the United States by notifying the Attorney
General as provided in rule 4(d)(4).
With respect to venue, section 139l(e) allows actions against
federal officers or agencies, acting in their official capacity or under
color of legal authority, to be brought in the district in which "(l) a
defendant in the action resides, or (2) the cause of action arose, or
(3) any real property involved in the action is situated, or (4) the
plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action." 294
Although adopted as part of the Mandamus and Venue Act of
1962,295 section 139l(e) is not limited to mandamus actions but applies broadly to all types of suits against federal officers or agencies
except those governed by a special statutory review provision that
deals with venue. 296
Section 139l(e) is phrased in terms of suits against officers and
does not appear to be applicable to suits against the United States
eo nomine. Detailed venue provisions govern suits against the United
States.297 If plaintiffs were to be given an option of suing the United
States in addition to or in lieu of suing the officer, section 139l(e)
would need to be broadened to control venue in such actions. 298
By allO"wing nationwide substituted service on the superior officer, section 139l(e) circumvents the technical requirement that superior officers be joined as parties defendant. A long line of cases
established the proposition, easy to state but difficult to apply, that
"the superior officer is an indispensable party if the decree granting
the relief sought will require him to take action, either by exercising
directly a power lodged in him or by having a subordinate exercise
294. For an excellent general discussion of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962,
see Byse &: Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARV. L. REv. 308
(1967); Jacoby, The Effect of Recent Changes in the Law of "Nonstatutory" Judidal
Review, 53 GEo. L.J. 19 (1964).
295. See note 292 supra.
296. See Jacoby, supra note 294, at 32.
297. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a) (1964) (tax refund claims against United States): 28
U.S.C. § 1402(b) (1964) (tort claims against United States).
298. See the proposed revision of 28 U.S.C. § 139l(e) in the conclusion of this
Article, p. 469 infra, which would add actions against "the United States" to the
categories of cases in which venue and service of process are governed by that section.
The addition of the United States to the general venue provisions of § 1391 would not
displace the special· venue provisions applicable to the United States (see note 297
supra) since special venue provisions would override the general provision.
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it for him." 299 Prior to the enactment of section 139l(e), limitations
on venue and on service of process often gave decisive significance
to the plaintiff's failure to join a superior officer.300 Broadened venue
and extraterritorial service under section 139l(e), however, have,
for the most part, eliminated the importance of the indispensability
doctrine, since the superior officer can now be joined as a defendant
in any local district court. The legislative history of the section demonstrates that the law should not be tailored for the convenience of
the Government, but that, rather, there should be "readily available,
inexpensive judicial remedies for the citizen who is aggrieved by
the workings of Government."301 The Congress noted that the law
of parties defendant was not altogether clear in either logic or consistency and that such actions "are in essence against the United
States.'' 302 Hence Congress seems committed to providing a path
through the procedural maze.
The confusing law governing the required joinder of superior
officers,303 however, has been circumvented rather than eliminated.
Government attorneys who are more interested in scoring tactical
points than in obtaining just results may still argue that an unjoined
superior is indispensable and that he cannot be joined at a later
time if the passage of time creates a bar.304 That argument should be
299. Williams v. Fanning, 332 U.S. 490, 493 (1947) (the Postmaster General was not
indispensable to a suit against a local postmaster, because the latter could resume de•
livery of mail properly withheld). For an ample impression of the degree of confusion
in the case law, see Davis, supra note 283, at 438-51.
300. Since venue was proper only where "all defendants reside" or where "the
claim arose," 28 U.S.C. § 139l(b) (1964), and since service of process could not be
effected on a superior in the plaintiff's home district, the plaintiff's only choice was
to sue the superior in the District of Columbia. Limitations on venue and service of
process thus had the effect, when combined with the indispensable party rule, of
centralizing in the District of Columbia a great deal of nonstatutory review of federal
administrative action, thereby causing inconvenience and expense to distant plaintiffs.
See Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign
Immunity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 HARv. L. R£v. 1479, 1493-99 (1962).
301. H.R. REP. No. 536, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1961).
302. Id. at 4.
303. Compare Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86 (1949) (the Secretary of the
Interior is not an indispensable party to a suit to enjoin a regional director from
enforcing regulations interfering with plaintiff's fishing rights), with Blackmar v.
Guerre, 342 U.S. 512 (1952) (members of the Civil Service Commission are indispensable parties to a reinstatement action brought by a discharged employee against his
regional supervisor).
304. In some situations, such as review of social security determinations, a statute
of limitations bars a review proceeding that is not properly brought within a designated period (see note 319 infra). In other situations the doctrine of !aches performs a
similar function. Dismissal may also result because the plaintiff has failed to perfect
service of process within a reasonable time (see cases cited in note 288 supra).
In Bell v. Groak, 371 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1966), a discharged postal employee sought
mandatory relief to require the Civil Service Commission to entertain his administra•
tive appeal. The suit was brought against the Chairman of the Commission as an
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rejected. The remedial purposes of the 1966 amendment to rule
15(c) of the Federal Rules clearly contemplate that an amendment
adding a superior officer relates back to the filing of the original
complaint if process has been served on the Government's Ia-wyers.305
The inevitable uncertainty implicit in attempting to unravel the
authority of officials in order to ascertain whether a subordinate
indeed has authority to afford the relief sought can be met, of course,
by joining all possible officers as parties defendant. But plaintiffs
who do not thus encumber their complaints cannot properly be
thrown out of court. In view of the liberal "relation back" provisions
of rule 15(c), government lawyers should take prompt steps to
remedy any defects arising from the nonjoinder of superior officers.
The Department of Justice should instruct United States Attorneys
to assist plaintiffs in curing such defects, rather than to move for
dismissal on that ground.306

2. Rule 25(d): Substitution of Successor Officers
and Misnomer
Prior to its amendment in 1961, the provision of rule 25(d) of
the Federal Rules, which deals with the continuance of actions
brought by or against public officers who died or were separated
from office, was "a trap for unsuspecting litigants ... unworthy of a
great government."307 Authoritative Supreme Court decisions had
construed the language of rule 25(d) to require abatement of an
action in which plaintiff failed to substitute a successor officer within
six months after the original defendant had died or left office.308 A
general recognition that this harsh rule produced unjust results
provided the impetus for the 1961 amendment. 309
As amended in 1961, rule 25(d) provides for automatic substituindividual. After the Government had objected that the other members of the Commission were indispensable parties, the complaint was amended to join them, but no
attempt was made to serve process on them. On appeal, the failure to perfect service
resulted in dismissal even though the decision below was not based on that ground.
If the plaintiff had had warning, he might have requested time within which to perfect service.
305. See the discussion of rule 15(c) in the text accompanying notes 315-21 infra.
See also the explanation of the purpose of the 1966 amendment to rule 15(c) in the
Advisory Committee's Note, reprinted in 3 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1049-53 (2d
ed. 1968).
306. See text accompanying note 338 infra.
307. Vibra Brush Corp. v. Schaffer, 256 F.2d 681, 684 (2d Cir. 1958).
308. Klaw v. Schaffer, 357 U.S. 346 (1958); McGrath v. National Assn. of Mfrs.,
344 U.S. 804 (1952); Snyder v. Buck, 340 U.S. 15 (1950).
309. See, e.g., Davis, Government Officers as Defendants: Two Troublesome Problems, 104 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 68 (1955).
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tion of public officers.310 It eliminates the needless formality of
numerous orders of substitution in situations in which a public
officer, by whose name or against whom a great many actions have
been brought, dies or resigns. If, as frequently happens, the parties
and the court are unaware of the change in the office, the litigation
can be continued under the name by which the action was commenced without affecting its validity. When and if the Government
raises the question, the name can be changed, no matter how much
time has elapsed.3 11
The Advisory Committee's note to the 1961 amendment makes
it clear that "mistaken analogies to the doctrine of sovereign immunity" should not control the determination of whether the officer is acting "in his official capacity" within the meaning of the
rule. 312 A common-sense approach makes the rule applicable "to any
action brought in form against a named officer, but intrinsically
against the government ...." 313 Thus, rule 25(d) is applicable except when the officer is not acting under color of federal law or when
he is personally liable in damages. Problems with respect to the substitution of officers have been eliminated.
Rule 25(d) also deals with the problem of misnomer. The constant growth and reorganization of the federal government make it
difficult for even the well-informed citizen to be certain which officer
or agency is responsible for a particular activity and under what
official title. A statute often empowers a cabinet-level secretary to
perform a particular function; a regulation of the secretary later
delegates the function to a subordinate; a subsequent legislative reorganization proposal vests the function in a semiautonomous board
within the department; and later legislation may even transfer the
board and function to another department. Instances of this type,
in which it is difficult to determine precisely who is responsible for
a particular activity, are frequent and familiar. The problem is to
310. FED. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(l):
When a public officer is a party to an action in his official capacity and during
its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action does not
abate and his successor is automatically substituted as a party. Proceedings following the substitution shall be in the name of the substituted party, but any
misnomer not affecting the substantial rights of the parties shall be disregarded.
An order of substitution may be entered at any time, but the omission to enter
such an order shall not affect the substitution.
311. For an excellent discussion of the meaning and application of the amended
rule, see Wright, Substitution of Public Officers: The 1961 Amendment to Rule 25(d),
27 F.R.D. 221 (1961).
312. Advisory Committee Note to 1961 amendment, reprinted in 3B J. l\IooRE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE ,i 25.09[3], p. 25-404 (2d ed. 1969).
3lll. Id.
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ensure that a plaintiff who makes his intent to review a particular
administrative activity fairly clear is not thrown out of court on the
ground of misnomer. Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure attempts to solve the problem by providing that "any misnomer not affecting the substantial rights of the parties shall be
disregarded" and that the officer may be "described as a party by his
official title rather than by name." The use of the official title without any mention of the officer individually recognizes the intrinsic
character of the action and assists in eliminating concern with the
problem of substitution. In fact, when an action is brought by or
against a board or an agency that has continuity of existence, naming
the individual members serves no useful purpose.314

3. Rule 15(c): Failure To Name Any Appropriate Defendant
In some instances, the problem is more than misnomer and involves the failure to name any appropriate officer or agency as defendant. With respect to such a situation, unjust results were
frequent prior to the 1966 amendment to rule 15(c). In these cases,
most of which involved attempts to obtain judicial review of social
security disability determinations, the plaintiffs mistakenly named
as defendants the United States,315 the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,316 the "Federal Security Administration" (a
predecessor agency), 317 and a Secretary who had retired from office
nineteen days before.318 The statutory review provision requires that
judicial review of denials of social security benefits be brought
against the Secretary within sixty days. 319 By the time the claimants
discovered their mistakes, the statutory limitation period had expired, and they were denied judicial review.820 Academic criticism
lH4. See 3B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcnCE ,J 25.09 (2d ed.); Comment, Civil Procedure-Abatement-Status of Suit Nominally Against Government Official When Official Leaves Office, 50 MICH. L. REv. 443, 450 (1952).
315. Cunningham v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 541 (W .D. Mo. 1958).
316. Hall v. Department of Health, Education &: Welfare, 199 F. Supp. 833 (S.D.
Tex. 1960).
317. Cohn v. Federal Security Administration, 199 F. Supp. 884 (W.D.N.Y. 1961).
318. Sandridge v. Folsom, 200 F. Supp. 25 (M.D. Tenn. 1959).
319. 42 u.s.c. § 405(g) (1964).
320. It is only fair to point out that the Government took administrative steps to
cure the problem. The Department of Justice instructed United States Attorneys "to
take especial pains to be sure that our practice of advising the plaintiff of the defect
is followed where the plaintiff's failure is noted before the running of the sixty-day
limitation period." Department of Justice Memorandum No. 380 (July 14, 1964)
(available at the Library of the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.). The
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare issued a regulation liberally authorizing
an extension of time within which to file a new suit when an incorrect defendant had
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of these decisions321 led to the inclusion of a curative provision in
the 1966 amendment to rule 15(c). That provision states that an
amendment of the pleadings, adding or changing parties defendant
in actions "with respect to the United States or any agency or officer
thereof," relates back to the date of the original pleading whenever
process was delivered or mailed "to the United States Attorney or
his designee, or the Attorney General of the United States, or an
agency or officer who would have been a proper defendant if
named." This sentence allows a plaintiff who is in doubt about the
identity of the proper officer or agency to commence his action by
serving process on one of those designated parties. Difficulty in ascertaining the proper defendant is often understandable in light of
the vast array of government officers and agencies and in light of
the technicalities that govern parties defendant. Under rule 15(c)
the plaintiff who has served any one of the persons designated may
correct his pleading when the United States moves to dismiss on
grounds that a particular officer was not named or joined as a defendant.322 Dismissal is proper under the amended Rules only when
the plaintiff fails to amend his pleading and to complete service on
been served within the statutory period. 29 Fed. Reg. 8209 (1964), 20 C.F.R. § 404.954(b)
(1969).
The problem, however, is not confined to social security disability determinations.
See, e.g., Bell v. Groak, 371 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1966) (failure to perfect service on all
members of the Civil Service Commission); Chournos v. United States, 335 F.2d 918
(10th Cir. 1964) (the plaintiff named as defendants the Bureau of Land Management
and the Department of Interior rather than individual officers; the court held that the
named defendants "are not suable entities"); M.G. Davis &: Co. v. SEC, 252 F. Supp.
402 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (nonstatutory review action challenging an action of the Securities
and Exchange Commission must be brought against its individual members).
321. See Byse, Suing the "Wrong" Defendant in Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Proposals for Reform, 77 HARv. L. REv. 40 (1963).
322. Cases holding to the contrary either were decided prior to the 1966 amendment of rule 15(c) or they are erroneous. In Smith v. McNamara, 395 F.2d 896 (10th
Cir. 1968), for example, in which the court dismissed an action because the proper
officer was not served, the court's attention was not directed to the amendment to
rule 15(c).
There is a degree of tension between rule 4(d)(4) and rule 15(c). When the action
"attack[s] the validity of an order of an officer or agency not made a party," rule
4(d)(4) requires that a copy of the summons and complaint be sent by registered mail
to such officer or agency. Dismissals have resulted in some cases when the plaintiff has
failed to perfect service on the officer or agency within a reasonable time. Compare
cases cited in note 288 supra, with cases cited in note 290 supra. On the other hand,
rule 15(c) contemplates great liberality in amending a complaint to add an additional
defendant who is indispensable, so long as the Government has received notice of the
action by service being made upon the local United States Attorney, the Attorney
General, or an officer or agency who would be a proper defendant if named. The
underlying purpose of rule 15(c)-that a plaintiff's claim against the Government
should not be dismissed because the wrong defendants were named-should take
precedence over older notions requiring service to be performed with punctilious
exactitude.
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the proper officer within a reasonable time after the defect is raised.
A liberal application of these three remedial provisions should
prevent dismissals based on technicalities of the law of officers, for
the Congress and the draftsmen of the Federal Rules have indicated
with great clarity that actions challenging federal conduct should
be decided on the merits rather than on narrow procedural grounds.
Unfortunately, however, the attempts of Congress and the draftsmen
to ameliorate the law of parties defendant have not been entirely
successful. That failure results from the fact that no attempt was
made to change the law of parties defendant, but only to alleviate
particular problems that had proved troublesome. Moreover, neither
the Department of Justice nor lower courts have accorded these
measures the liberal reception they deserve. Elimination of difficulties in this area will come only if the choice of defendants and
their capacity to be sued is dealt with directly. Consequently, further changes are required.
B. Proposals for Reform
The elimination of sovereign immunity, proposed in part I of
this Article, will help in solving the problems in the law of Pc!rties
defendant. As noted previously, the indispensability of the United
States as a party to certain actions is variously viewed as merely a
different way of phrasing the doctrine of sovereign immunity and as
a separate doctrine with an independent rationale.323 The same
arguments that support the partial elimination of sovereign immunity also support the elimination of the indispensability notion.
The proposal urged in part I and adopted by the Administrative
Conference of the United States accomplishes this desirable objective.
But even if the sovereign immunity doctrine is eliminated as a
barrier to judicial review of federal administrative action, the technical requirements with respect to parties defendant will remain
as troublesome relics of the past. Thus, the elimination of sovereign
immunity is not enough; the technicalities themselves must be eliminated. This goal can be accomplished by two amendments to the
United States Code. The first is the amendment of section 703 of
title 5, which is concerned with form of proceeding in actions for
judicial review, to add the following language:
If no special statutory review procedure is applicable, the action for
323. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
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judicial review may be brought against the United States, the agency
by its official title, or the appropriate officer.324
The second reform is the amendment of section 139l(e) of title 28
to eliminate the word "each" in the present language limiting the
section's broadened venue and extraterritorial service of process to
"[a] civil action in which each defendant is an officer or employee
of the United States."325 The amendment would allow a plaintiff to
utilize the broadened venue and extraterritorial service of process of
section 139l(e) in actions in which nonfederal defendants who can be
served within the state in which the action is brought are joined
with federal defendants. Such a provision would eliminate improper
venue as an objection to such joinder, but would not affect the discretion of the court under the Federal Rules to determine that
joinder was improper, or not in the interests of justice in a particular case.
I. Section 703: Capacity To Sue an Agency by Its Official
Title and Capacity To Sue the United States

When an instrumentality of the United States is the real defend:mt, and an authorized legal representative of the United States
has been served, the names on the pleading should be irrelevant,
The plaintiff should have the option of naming as defendants the
United States, the agency by its official title, appropriate officers, or
any combination of them, and the outcome should not turn on the
plaintiff's choice. The proposed amendment of section 703 will accomplish these ends.
a. Capacity to sue an agency by its official title. The lower federal courts, at the behest of government lawyers, continue to dismiss
actions of which the Government has received adequate notice, on
the ground that other names should have gone on the pleadings. A
recent suit against "the Chairman, Civil Service Commission" was
dismissed because the other Commissioners were indispensable
parties.326 Since rule 25(d) provides that a public officer "may be
324. See the proposed revision of 5 U.S.C. § 703 in the conclusion of this Article,
p. 469 infra. The quoted sentence was included in Recommendation 9 of the Admininstrative Conference of the United States, adopted on October 21, 1969. Recommendation 9 also would amend 5 U.S.C. § 702 to add the following sentence: "The United
States may be named as a defendant in any such action [for judicial review of administrative action], and a judgment or decree may be entered against the United States."
325. See the proposed revision of 28 U.S.C. § 139I(e) in the conclusion of this
Article, p. 469 infra.
326. CORE v. Commissioner, 270 F. Supp. 537, 542 (D. Md. 1967) (alternative
holding). See also Bell v. Groak, 371 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1966).
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described as a party by his official title rather than by name," the
defect would not have been present if the suit had been brought
against "the members of the United States Civil Service Commission." Dismissals of this type since the effective date of the 1966
amendment to rule 15(c) are questionable, since rule 15(c) allows
the plaintiff who has served process on the local United States Attorney, the Attorney General, or the agency, to amend his pleading
without penalty.a21
Allowing the plaintiff to sue the agency by its official title would
be a step in the right direction.328 Under the proposal an "agency,"
as defined in the APA, would possess a limited capacity to be sued,
applicable only to actions seeking judicial review of the agency's
activities. The agency could not be sued in other types of actions,
such as one to recover damages in tort. In this way, one common
type of defect concerning the naming of parties defendant would
disappear.
b. Capacity to sue the United States. The suit against the officer,
challenging his official conduct, served a useful purpose as a device
for circumventing the sovereign immunity doctrine. Once sovereign
immunity is tamed, however, requiring the plaintiff to cast his suit
in that form is no longer essential. Everyone recognizes that the suit
is in fact against the United States or one of its agencies and involves
the legality of governmental action. The important objective at this
point is to eliminate any remaining technical requirements. This
objective is best achieved by allowing the plaintiff a wide choice in
naming defendants and sanctioning his choice whatever it may be.
The United States should be one of the available alternatives. The
complaint, of course, must indicate the nature of the plaintiff's claim
327. See text accompanying notes 305, 322 supra.
328. The Task Force on Legal Services and Procedures of the Commission on
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Second Hoover Commission)
recommended that "any problem of just who the true defendant is" should be avoided
by allowing proceedings for review to be brought against "(l) the agency by its official
title, (2) individuals who comprise the agency, or (3) any person representing an agency,
or acting on its behalf or under color of its authority." REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND
PROCEDURE'S 211 (March 1955).
Proposed revisions of the AP A have also included language amending § lO(b), as
amended, 5 U.S.C. § 703 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), to provide that "[t]he action for judicial
review may be brought against the agency by its official title." An accompan}ing committee report stated:
This language would not preclude the bringing of the action against the individual comprising the agency or any person representing the agency or acting on its
behalf in the matter under review. Bringing the action against the agency by
name, however, would be simpler and more effective and would avoid those technical difficulties encountered in the past when the officials against whom an action
was brought have resigned or have died or have been replaced for some other
reason.
s. REP. No. 1234, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1966).
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so that service of process under rule 4(d)(4) will suffice to give government lawyers adequate notice of the claim.
Professor Davis has urged the adoption of a statutory proposal
that would tie the elimination of sovereign immunity to a form of
suit in which the United States is named as defendant. 329 That proposal would discourage the suit against the officer and gradually
displace it with an action against the United States. One objection
to Davis' position is that a mandatory requirement of form of suit
creates a new technical trap that some lawyers and plaintiffs would
be certain to fall into. Moreover, the profession is familiar with the
suit against the officer or agency, and federal statutes and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure have been drafted in the light of existing
practice. Fundamental changes in the form of the suit would
require reconsideration and possible revision of these other provisions.330 Settled rules concerning legal representation of governmental interests might also be affected.331 Besides, the form of suit
against the officer or agency, when relieved of the artificialities of
the sovereign immunity doctrine, is not distaseful. On the contrary,
the individual is in fact complaining about the conduct of a particular officer or agency and there may be psychological advantages in
329. The statutory proposal advanced in 3 K. DAVIS,

.ADMINISTRATIVE

I.Aw TREATISI:

§ 27.10, at 165 (Supp. 1968), did not tie waiver of sovereign immunity to a form of

suit in which the United States is named as defendant, but Professor Davis has ad•
vanced this position in subsequent letters and memoranda sent to the author.
330. Revision of § 139l(e) of the Judicial Code to allow the use of extraterritorial
service of process and local venue when the United States is named as a defendant in
an action for judicial review is desirable in its own right. Section 1391(e) at present
does not appear to be applicable to suits against the United States eo nomine, since
the United States cannot be considered to be an "officer or agency" of the United
States. Although there is a special venue provision dealing with actions in which the
United States is a defendant, that provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1402 (1964), applies to only
three kinds of damage actions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1964) (Tucker Act
cases, Federal Tort Claims Act cases, and federal tax cases). In addition, the general
venue provision applicable to federal-question cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1964), is difficult to apply, since it allows the action to be brought only in the district in which
"all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose." If the United States, like a
corporation, resides where it is doing business, that is, everywhere, the general venue
provision of § 139l(b) is too broad, since suit could be brought on any claim in any
judicial district chosen by the plaintiff. On the other hand, if, as seems more likely,
a residence cannot be attributed to the United States, the action may be brought only
where the cause of action arose, a much narrower venue choice than that provided
by 28 U.S.C. § 139l(e) (1964), which was drafted with the situation of the suit against
the officer in mind. In short, broadened venue of judicial review actions in which
the United States is named as a defendant is a desirable reform in any event. It becomes a necessity if the plaintiff, in order to circumvent sovereign immunity, is
required to bring his action against the United States. Without the reform, the
inconvenience and unfairness of requiring plaintiffs to come to Washington, D.C., to
attack local adininistration of federal activities would be re-created.
331. This problem is not likely to be a very serious one. See text accompanying
notes 340-42 infra.
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allowing him to bring his suit against the officer or agency that
allegedly has harmed him. In addition, the anonymity of the United
States will bury all cases involving nonstatutory review in indices
and case finders with all criminal cases and damage cases under the
uninformative heading of "Doe v. United States." The nature of the
case is revealed much more by "Doe v. Laird" or "Doe v. Secretary
of Defense."
The problems with the suit against the officer or agency, then,
are not in its form. Rather the problems revolve around the technical rules that some courts have applied on such matters as capacity
of an agency to be sued, identification of the proper officer, and indispensability of superior officers. Most of these matters have been
solved, and the proposal advanced in this Article would complete
the task.
2. Section 1391(e): ]oinder of Third Persons as
Parties Defendant

For reasons of its own convenience in litigation, the Department
of Justice prefers to have federal interests and federal law resolved
in law suits in which the Department can exercise a high degree of
control over the joinder of related parties and issues. United States
Attorneys are told that "they are not authorized to waive objections
as to . . . third-party joinders and the like, without first clearing
such matters with the Civil Division [in Washington] which in turn
will clear them with the affected agencies.'' 332 When section 1391(e)
was enacted in 1962, the availability of the extraterritorial service
of process and the broadened venue was limited-apparently at the
behest of the Department of Justice-to judicial review actions "in
which each defendant is an officer or employee of the United States
or an agency thereof.'' 333
Remarkable as it may seem, there is a conflict of authority on
whether the statute means what it says-that the plaintiff cannot
join nonfederal third persons as defendants in an action under section 139l(e).334 Indeed, apart from the language, there is no func332. U.S. DEPT. OF JusnCE, MANUAL FOR UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS tit. 3, at 3
(Supp. 1965) (available at the Library of the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.).
333. 28 U.S.C. § 139l(e) (1964) (emphasis added). The legislative history provides
no explanation for the inclusion of the word "each." See S. REP. No. 1992, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1962).
334. Compare Chase Sav. &: Loan Assn. v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 269 F.
Supp. 965 (E.D. Pa. 1967), in which the court dismissed an action joining the federal
board and a local bank, on the ground of improper venue, with Powelton Civic Home
Owners Assn. v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809, 833 (E.D. Pa. 1968), in which the court held
that effectuation of the "apparent intent" of § 139l(e) requires that the "each de-
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tional justification for this limitation, for it prevents relief in some
situations in which the federal courts can make a special contribution.335 In many public land controversies, for example, three parties
are involved-the official, a successful applicant, and an unsuccessful one. Effective relief cannot be obtained in an action in which
the United States or its officer is not involved; but if the Government is named as defendant, section 139l(e) prevents the joinder of
the other private person as a defendant, and that person cannot be
joined as a plaintiff because his interest is adverse to that of the
plaintiff.336 Another common type of situation in which the limitation is troublesome is that in which specific relief is sought against
federal and state officers who are cooperating in a regulatory or enforcement program.337
The crux of the matter is whether there are sound reasons of
policy for excepting actions brought against federal officers or agencies from the general principles that control party joinder in federal
courts. The embarrassment of being joined as a defendant by state
officers or private persons with whom it may be alleged that federal
officials cooperated does not seem to be a sufficient basis for special
fendant" language be read as referring "only to defendants who are beyond the forum's
territorial limits." Hence, the court held, the joinder of state officers who could be
served within the district was proper.
335. In Town of East Haven v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 507, 510-11 (D.
Conn. 1968), the court reluctantly dismissed for improper venue after criticizing the
requirement of § 139l(e) that "each" defendant be a federal officer or agency:
The wording does prevent the hardship which could result if a non-government defendant were subjected to the provision's liberal service of process and
venue rules merely because the governmnt was also joined as a defendant in the
same action. But the wording does appear unnecessarily broad and without justification where there is independent authority for service of process and venue
with respect to each non-government party joined as a defendant. The only possible argument in support of the requirement in such instances is that enough of
a burden has been placed on government officials and agencies by subjecting them
to suits away from their official residences without placing upon them the additional burden of defending a suit with non-government co-defendants. The weakness of this argument is evident. The burden, if it is one at all, cannot be a great
one and certainly is minor in comparison to the burden placed on the plaintiff
of having to bring separate actions. At any rate, there is no indication that Congress was acting to avoid this additional burden upon the government.
336. Section 139l(e) is unavailing in the typical case involving the use of public
lands. In such a case, the Secretary of the Interior makes an award to an individual
defendant but the plaintiff claims a right to it. The problem arises since the plaintiff
is unable to join the Secretary and the individual defendant as parties defendant with•
out creating a venue objection. The same problem of parties emerges, moreover, if the
court proceedings take the form of an action between private parties-an action in
which the Secretary is not heard and in which the United States may not be named
without danger of a dismissal on the ground that the suit is one against the United
States and hence not maintainable without the latter's consent. For the protection of
third parties, private or governmental, the laws relating to the federal court system
are simply inadequate.
337. See cases cited in notes 334·35 supra.
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treatment. Thus, section 139l(e) should be amended to allow for
effective relief and binding judgments in multiple party situations.
Deletion of the word "each" and substitution of "a" will achieve
part of this objective. The addition of a new sentence permitting
joinder of nonfederal defendants who can be served in accordance
with the normal rules governing service of process, would cure the
venue objection that now stands in the way of convenient and ap•
propriate joinder. Other objections to such joinder, stemming from
the discretion vested in the trial judge under the Federal Rules to
control the dimensions of the lawsuit and to protect particular
parties, would be unaffected. Since the plaintiff would be required to
state a substantial claim against federal officers, use of this special
venue provision as a sham to circumvent normal venue requirements
will not be a problem.
3. Role of the Justice Department
If these statutory reforms are to be effective, the Department of

Justice must make firm efforts to instruct its lawyers and United
States Attorneys not to raise technical defects with respect to the
naming of parties defendant but to take active steps to cure such
defects. Once a plaintiff has stated the gravamen of his complaint
and has served process in accordance with rule 4(d)(4), the burden
should be on the Department to determine who within our complex
federal establishment is responsible for the alleged wrong.338 If there
are reasons for joining that individual or agency as a party defendant, the Department of Justice should take the initiative in adding
the desired party defendant. In any case, the Department should
never urge that a case be dismissed because of technical defects
about naming parties defendant. 339

4. Legal Representation and Res ]udicata
The proposed amendments advanced with respect to parties defendant raise two potential problems. The first concerns the proposal
allowing but not requiring a plaintiff to bring his action for judicial
review against the United States: if a plaintiff did bring such an
888. Cf. the provisions of the Crown Proceedings Act of Great Britain. Section 17(3)
of that Act provides that in tort claims against the government such
rc]ivil proceedings against the crown shall be instituted against the appropriate
authorized Government department, or, if none of the authorized Government departments is appropriate or the person instituting the proceedings has any reasonable doubt whether any and if so which of those departments is appropriate,
against the Attorney General.
10 &: 11 Geo. 6, c. 44 (1947) (emphasis added).
839. See text accompanying note 306 supra.
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action, would it affect the question of whose lawyers should represent the defendant? The problem arises because the Department of
Justice alone is authorized to defend "the United States" in court,840
while a limited number of federal agencies have authority to defend
their own orders in suits brought against them. The proposal's potential impact, however, appears to be nonexistent. The provisions
authorizing agencies to defend their own orders are generally part
of statutory review provisions such as the Judicial Review Act of
1950.841 Since specific statutory review provisions are unaffected by
the proposal, and since nonstatutory review actions against those
agencies must now-at least in theory-be defended by the Department of Justice, the opportunity to name the United States could
affect the question of representation only if an agency has general
authority to represent itself and if suits to review its orders need not
be brought under special statutory review provisions.342 Although
there might be such a situation, none has been found. The whole
problem, of course, is of interest only to government lawyers who
are attuned to intragovernmental feuding and are sensitive to the
desire of agencies to control the defense of their own activities.
The second problem raised by the proposals concerns the effect
on the United States of a judgment rendered in a suit against an
officer or agency. The theory of the officer's suit is that the officer,
by acting unconstitutionally or in excess of his authority, is no
longer acting in his official capacity. This fiction allowed circumvention of sovereign immunity, but raised questions concerning the
judgment's binding effect on the United States, which was not and
could not be made a party.343 A long line of cases states the rule that
340. See Exec. Order No. 6166 Gune 10, 1933), in 2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES
OF F.D.R. 223 (S. Rosenman ed. 1938), which concentrated all government litigation
functions in the Department of Justice. For a partial list of statutes and executive
orders with respect to the conduct of government litigation by lawyers of agencies other
than the Department of Justice, see D. SCHWARTZ&: s. JACOBY, GOVERNMENT LmGATION
-CASES AND NOTES 26-27 (1963).
341. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-51 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
342. The authority of the ICC "to appear for and represent the Commission in
any case in court" appears to be so broad and specific [49 U.S.C. § 16(11) (1964)] that
it would not be overridden by a general provision allowing the plaintiff, in nonstat•
utory review actions, to name the United States as defendant. The question, of course,
might never arise because judicial review of ICC orders is controlled by exclusive and
detailed statutory provisions which provide for parties defendant and for separate
representation of the Commission by its own lawyers.
343. See, e.g., Carr v. United States, 98 U.S. 433 (1878), in which the Court held
that the United States was not precluded by a judgment in an ejectment suit brought
by the present defendant's predecessor against government agents who were in possession of the disputed land. See also Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U.S. 255 (1896). In Land
v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 736 (1947), in which the Court held that a suit against an
officer was not barred by sovereign immunity, Justice Douglas twice stated that "an
adjudication [against the officer] is not res judicata against the United States because
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the United States is not bound by a judgment in an unconsented in
personam action against one of its officers.344 These cases rest on
the premise that, since only Congress can waive sovereign immunity,
it would be anomalous to allow the same result to be reached by
the decision of a government lawyer to defend a suit brought
against an officer. If sovereign immunity is eliminated in actions for
specific relief, however, the limited effect of a judgment against an
officer would vanish with the disappearance of its underlying rationale. The suit against the officer who is acting in his official
capacity would be seen as it really is-as an action against the United
States brought with its consent.
As a matter of general policy, the Department of Justice affords
counsel and representation to federal employees when suits are
brought against them in connection with the performance of their
official duties. 345 The policy extends even to in personam actions
that arise out of their official duties. A few cases, difficult to reconcile
with the larger number to the contrary,346 apply more usual notions
of collateral estoppel in holding that the United States is bound by
a judgment against its officers, when authorized legal representatives
of the United States have represented the officer and controlled the
defense. 347 With the partial elimination of sovereign immunity,
these decisions will represent federal law. General principles of res
judicata and finality support the proposition that the United States
it cannot be made a party to the suit." A similar statement was repeated in his dis•·
senting opinion in Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 650 (1962).

344. See, e.g., Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U.S. 255, 270 (1896):
The United States, by various acts of Congress, have consented to be sued
in their own courts in certain classes of cases; but they have never consented to
be sued in the courts of a State in any case. Neither the Secretary of War nor the
Attorney General, nor any subordinate of either, has been authorized to waive the
exemption of the United States from judicial process, or to submit the United
States, or their property, to the jurisdiction of the court in a suit brought against
their officers .••• The answer actually filed by the District Attorney, if treated
as undertaking to make the United States a party defendant in the cause, and
liable to have judgment rendered against them, was in excess of the instruction
of the Attorney General, and could not constitute a voluntary submission by the
United States to the jurisdiction of the court.
345. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, MANUAL FOR UNITED STATES ATIO:ft.NEYS tit. 3, at 4 (Supp.
1965) (available at the Library of the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.). See
also D. SCHWARTZ &: s. JACOBY, GOVERNMENT LITIGATION-CAsES AND NOTES 19-20 (1963).
346. See cases cited in notes 343-44 supra.
!147. See, e.g., United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 444 (1926), in which the
Court held that the United St.ates was estopped from asserting title to land claimed by
an Indian pueblo if the United States had employed and paid a special attorney to
litigate title on behalf of the pueblo in a prior suit. See also Drummond v. United
States, !124 U.S. 316 (1945), in which the Court held that payment by the United
States of the fee of an attorney who represented an Indian in land litigation did not
bind the United States; the Court stated that in order "to bind the United States when
it is not formall1 a party, it must have a laboring oar in a controversy."
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should be bound by a judgment when it has controlled the defense
in a suit against the oflicer.848 In the future it will appear natural
and just if the United States is precluded under such circumstances,
and unconscionable if the United States is not bound.
IV. CONCLUSION

Compared to the great problems of our age-racial conflict, nuclear war, environmental quality, and so on-sovereign immunity
and the other matters dealt with in this Article are relatively trivial
and unimportant. Yet they are subjects that cry out for reform.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has long since outlived its
usefulness. An expansion of federal jurisdiction to broaden the opportunities of citizens to obtain judicial review would also be beneficial. Finally, the remaining problems associated with the law of
parties defendant are overdue for total elimination.849 Congress, by
adopting the provisions indicated below, can make a substantial contribution to society by promoting rationality in a complex and intricate specialty of federal law.850

UNITED STATES CODE
Title 5

702. Right of review
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning
of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. An action
in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee
thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color
of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein denied
on the ground that it is against the United States or that the United
§

348. See, e.g., Souffront v. Compagnie des Sucreries, 217 U.S. 475, 486-87 (1910):
The persons for whose benefit, to the knowledge of the court and of all the
parties to the record, litigation is being conducted cannot, in a legal sense, be said
to be strangers to the cause. The case is within the principle that one who prosecutes or defends a suit in the name of another to establish and :protect his own
right, or who assists in the prosecution or defense of an action m aid of some
interest of its own, and who does this openly to the knowledge of the opposing
party is as much bound by the judgment and as fully entitled to avail himself
of it as an estoppel against an adverse party, as he would be if he had been a
party to the record.
349. Another needed reform-a federal statute providing for a quiet-title proceeding to which the United States may be made a party-is badly needed. See text
accompanying notes 266-76 supra. The development of detailed statutory provisions,
however, requires further study than has been possible in connection with this Article.
350. Language to be added is in italics; language to be deleted is blocked out.

January 1970]

Review of Administrative Action

469

States is an indispensable party. The United States may be named
as a defendant in any such action, and a judgment or decree may be
entered against the United States. Nothing herein (1) affects other
limitations on judicial review or the power or duty of the court to
dismiss any action or deny relief on any other appropriate legal or
equitable ground; or (2) confers authority to grant relief if any other
statute that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids
the relief which is sought.
§ 703.

Form and venue of proceeding
The form of proceeding for judicial review is the special statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in a court
specified by statute or, in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any
applicable form of legal action, including actions for declaratory
judgments or ·writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction or
habeas corpus, in a court of competent jurisdiction. If no special
statutory review proceeding is applicable, the action for judicial
review may be brought against the United States, the agency by its
official title, or the appropriate officer. Except to the extent that
prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for judicial review is
provided by law, agency action is subject to judicial review in civil
or criminal proceedings for judicial enforcement.
Title 28
1331. Federal questions; amount m controversy; c-ests-W- The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions ·wherein -the matter -m- controveny e,.ceeds -the- -5tlf.B:- -ei::
-¥alHe--ef $10,000, m.:clusive 4 interest -and--€95-ts;- -and--aris€s- arising
under tl1e Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
W Except VrH-eE. m.:press prnvision therefor is- othendse :ma4@.
-in- -a- statute e£- -thg. United States, ·where -the plaintiff 4!; finally -aajudged t:e--ae- entitled -t0 reco•:er .J.€ss.-tha-n.-the-£t:HH.--er-va-lue-ef $10,000,
computed w·ithout 1·egard -te--an-y-~-er counterclaim -te-whi€li--thedefendant may-be adjudged te--ae entitled, iffifr exclusive ef interest
ana--eests, -the- district cel:lff--may- -d@n:y- -cests- -te--the- plaintiff a-nd;- -inaddition, :ma.:y impose cests--ea--the plaintiff.
§

§

1391. Venue generally

(e) A civil action in which a-eaai-defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official
capacity or under color of legal authority, or an agency of the United
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States, or the United States, may, except as otherwise provided by
law, be brought in any judicial district in which: (I) a defendant in
the action resides, or (2) the cause of action arose, or (3) any real
property involved in the action is situated, or (4) the plaintiff resides
if no real property is involved in the action. Additional persons may
be joined as parties to any such action in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure without regard to other venue requirements.
The summons and complaint in such an action shall be served
as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure except that the
delivery of the summons and complaint to the officer or agency as
required by the rules may be made by certified mail beyond the
territorial limits of the district in which the action is brought.

